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Abstract
The cost-minimization part of a specific factors model with perfect capital
movements and both perfect and imperfect competition is used here to explain
the growth rate of wages as a function of technical change, terms of trade
changes, interest rate changes and the growth rate of the labour supply. Our
estimation of the perfect competition model for 67 combinations of countries
and sectors yields the result that technical change explains a higher percentage
of wage growth than changes in the terms of trade do before the 1980s. From
the 1980s onwards international trade is slightly more influential than
technical progress. Much more important than these two are changes in the
sector specific labour supply in all countries but the UK. In the UK terms of
trade changes matter most. However, since we cannot exclude increasing
returns, a model with imperfect competition is also estimated. Besides a
confirmation of the strong results for labour, evidence of increasing returns
is found in especially the Netherlands and the US. Almost no evidence hereof
is found in Germany and the UK. Finally we consider policy conclusions.
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1 . The perfect competition part of this paper has been presented at the ESF confe-
rence ’Economic growth in closed and open economies’, Lucca, September 1997, the
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conference ’Unemployment in Europe’, Maastricht, October 1997. We especially
would like to thank Luc Soete, Huw Lloyd-Ellis, Giovanni Russo and Winfried Vogt
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appeared as MERIT Research Memorandum RM 98-001 but should not be quoted
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1. Introduction
Sectoral wages are the average of the wages for skilled and unskilled labour.
Explaining their development has recently led to some controversies (see Freeman
1995). The major problems discussed are why do wages for skilled and unskilled
labour diverge in the US and why has unemployment been heavily concentrated on
low-skilled workers in Europe? These shifts can also be observed in Newly
Industrialized Countries (NICs) (see Richardson 1995). The wage determination
question, however, is of broader interest.
Many economists using closed or open economy growth models would explain
wage growth mainly as a consequence of technical progress. Labour market
economists would tend to emphasize (sectoral) supply and demand with little weight
on international aspects (see Richardson 1995). Trade economists would tend to
ignore the supply of labour when using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However,
in a multisectoral world of international trade and capital movements it is tempting
to take a broader perspective. Consequently, one may ask the question what the
relative importance of the major determinants of (average) wage growth and
employment -international trade or factor movements, technological change or
labour market developments- are once one integrates all of them into one frame-
work. In this paper we try to answer this question with regard to the US and six
European countries (where wage inequality seemingly has changed much less than
in the US). The inequality issue will not be addressed in this paper. We analyze
average wages.
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Krugman (1994) have argued that internation-
al trade would have an impact on wages, if any, via changes in the terms of trade.
However, they indicated that the terms of trade of the US are almost unchanged and
therefore changes in wages must be due to technical change. This argument leaves
us with several open issues:
i) Results may be different for other countries than just the US;
ii) Results may change if we do not argue in terms of a two-sector model but at
a more disaggregated level, because some of us will remember that in continental
Europe the shipbuilding sector did shrink in the 1970s, automobile business was
faced with increased competition from Japan in the early 1980s and the European
consumer electronics sector lost grounds in the 1980s and 1990s. Ultimately,
protectionists lobby at the sectoral or even firm level and not at the macro level;
iii) Once international capital movements are taken into account, not only the
terms of trade but also interest rates become an exogenous variable for a (model
of a) country and their changes should have an impact on wage growth according
to economic theory.
How did the literature treat these three issues? The only contribution on average
wages so far is Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). Some other insights are gained
from the wage inequality debate by:
i) Lücke (1997), who has looked at data for Germany and the UK and Oscarsson
(1997) for Sweden. Seemingly, for many other countries this has not been done
(within an international trade framework). Oliveira Martins (1994), using an
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industrial economics rather than an international trade approach also looks at
several countries;
ii) Leamer (1996), who sees the point of relevance for single sectors too,
mentioning apparel and textiles in the US. Krugman and Lawrence (1993)
acknowledge that Japan did threaten US textiles in the 1960s and semiconductors
in the 1990s;
iii) Leamer (1993), who takes international capital movements into account when
making theoretical scenarios but not when running estimations. Wood (1994), as
well as Sachs and Shatz (1994), also look at several sectors and international
capital movements. However, they do not have an integrating framework but
rather look at all aspects, separately running regressions that give some intuition
on their idea that international trade, technology and international capital move-
ments are all important. Thus, it seems to be worthwhile to investigate all of
these points more closely.
Most of the wage inequality debate in international economics has been
conducted in terms of Heckscher-Ohlin models (see Sachs and Shatz 1994, Baldwin
and Cain 1997, Lücke 1997, Oscarsson 1997). Krugman and Obstfeld (1997) give
a justification for this choice: although labour may not be mobile between sectors
because its skills are specific to one sector only, reschooling could achieve the
desired mobility after some time which would justify the mobility assumption of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Against this we like to propose that before reschooling,
labour is specific to one (or several) sector(s) and after reschooling it is specific to
different sectors or just one. We prefer to capture this with a specific factors model
that has an exogenously changing labour supply for each sector and allows for
sectoral differences in wages, whereas the HO model does not (see Leamer 1994).
Also, most of the literature uses the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for the analysis (see
Leamer 1994, Richardson 1995, Baldwin and Cain 1997, Lücke 1997, Oscarsson
1997), which makes the latter heavily dependent on the empirical validity of the
zero-profit conditions in every sector or period2. Using the cost-minimization part
of a specific factors model with perfect competition and international capital
movements can avoid this drawback and provides a simple way to include the
supply of labour, technical change, international trade and factor movements in one
framework. Yet, it does so at the cost of slightly exaggerating the immobility aspect
of labour (which is now restricted to merely one sector). Other alternatives to the
Stolper-Samuelson approach are presented in Francois (1996).
2 . Note that the estimation of Jones’ (1970) dynamic version of the zero-profit conditions uses data
on factor shares (see Baldwin and Cain 1997), which consist of a cost term in the numerator and
revenue terms in the denominator. If we (empirically) have zero-profits on average across time, we
might guess from a business cycle perspective that there are losses in recessions and positive profits
in booms. This yields higher than average values of cost shares in recessions and lower values in
booms. In time series estimates this may bias the results, in particular in view of the possibility that
capital and labour shares may be affected unequally because of the irreversibility (or costly
reversibility) of the investment of capital which makes it difficult to reduce its cost in a recession.
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To allow for the treatment of more sectors motivated under point ii) above we
will construct a multisectoral, specific factors model in section 2. The inclusion of
international capital movements brings in interest rate changes in accordance with
the motivation of point iii) above. In section 3, some remarks on the data and
analysis techniques are made. Section 4 contains our main findings, whereafter
section 5 will discuss the policy conclusions which may be drawn from them.
Finally, section 6 addresses the limitations of our approach and gives some
guidelines for further research.
2. Model Description
The details of the model are as follows. For each product i we assume the
following production function to be responsible for the generation of variable costs,
where Y indicates output, K capital, L labour and A technology:
α, β and θ are elasticities of the production of capital, labour and technology. If
Y i (K i)αi(A i)θi(L i)β i
the sum of α and β is smaller, larger than or equal to one, we have decreasing,
increasing or constant returns to scale and therefore upward, downward or constant
sloping cost functions (for given technology A). We do not exclude any of these
cases a priori.
From cost minimization we get (with w as the wage rate and r as the interest
rate):
λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the technology constraint, whose economic
w i λiF iL i
r λiF iK i
interpretation is marginal costs. Lower indices K or L indicate a partial derivative
with respect to K or L. The three equations given above allow us to find a solution
for the value of the Lagrange multiplier λ. We get:
In case of perfect competition marginal costs equal prices given from the world
λ ( r
α
)
a
Y bA c( wβ )
d
with
a
α
α β ,b
1 α β
α β ,c
θ
α β ,d
β
α β
market (under the small country assumption) and marginal productivity conditions
can therefore be rewritten as:
Rewriting the marginal productivity conditions in growth rates, using the Cobb-
w i p iF iL i
r p iF iK i
Douglas form of production functions, and the elimination of the term for capital
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yields an equation for several sectors in different countries (we do not write down
a country index):
In this model, the terms of trade are exogenous in case of perfect competition and
wˆ i γ 1pˆ i γ 2rˆ γ 3 ˆA
i γ 4 ˆL
i
with
γ 1
1
1 αi
, γ 2
αi
1 αi
,
γ 3
θi
1 αi
, γ 4
β i αi 1
1 αi
the small country assumption. These assumptions are made in most of the related
literature. With perfect capital movements the real interest rate, r, is given from the
world market at each moment in time. Technology is exogenous by assumption and
so is labour input because of the assumption that it is specific to each sector.
Alternatively, we could have had employment as an endogenous variable and wages
as an exogenous one. Then the equation would try to explain employment of a
sector in a country3.
The right side of the above equation captures all variables that play a role in the
debate on real wages. International trade is captured by changes in the terms of
trade, technology is contained and international capital movements are represented
by changes in the interest rate. Finally, factor supply is included which could not
be done in a Stolper-Samuelson approach using the zero-profit assumption.
An estimate of this equation at the firm level would give us a result for α, the
elasticity of production of capital of a sector in a country, from either γ1 or γ2.
Therefore we have to impose or test the constraint that:
when doing the estimation. Having found a value for α we can deduct the value of
γ 1 γ 2 1,
β from γ4 and that of θ from γ3. The question whether or not we have increasing
returns to scale can be answered by looking at γ4. If it is less than, more than or
equal to zero, we have decreasing, increasing or constant returns to scale in labour
and capital. However, only if the previous coefficient restriction is accepted we may
draw such a conclusion, for then we can suspect that the definitions of the other
coefficients hold too. The assumption of perfect competition is only justified if we
have non-increasing returns to scale. In the case of increasing returns to scale we
have to resort to imperfect competition and endogenous prices. Therefore we must
3 . In the standard partial equilibrium labour market diagram an increase in the labour supply would
decrease wages. However, the increase in employment has an indirect effect via the marginal
productivity of capital, which is increased by higher employment and therefore more capital is
attracted from the world market. With the increase in capital, labour demand also increases which
would increase wages. Under increasing (decreasing) returns to scale the indirect demand effect is
stronger (weaker) than the direct supply effect.
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give up the small country assumption, because price determination by domestic
firms and prices given from the world market are mutually exclusive concepts (see
Helpman and Krugman 1989). If a sector is faced with a constant-elasticity demand
function, , with φ as an inverse of the price elasticity, Meu asp i B iY iφMiδeuMiεneu
import quantities of competing products from the EU, Mneu as their non-European
equivalent, B as a shift parameter which captures all other demand effects (such as
effects of other imports coming into the country), and each product being produced
by only one firm (as it would under monopolistic competition), profit maximization
will yield . Prices are now an endogenous variable because marginalp i λi/(φ i 1)
costs (λ) are endogenous for they depend on output and wages. A division between
European and non-European trade is made because competition from the Asian
NICs has been of special interest in the recent debate. If trade has an impact we
would expect δ,ε < 0.
Equating prices from the first-order conditions with those of the demand function
yields:
B iYiφMiδeuM
iε
neu λi/(φ i 1)
Taking growth rates of this equation, the marginal productivity conditions and the
expression for λ gives us four linear equations for four endogenous variables: the
growth rates of wages (w), capital (K), marginal costs (λ) and output (Y). The
exogenous variables are the growth rates of A, B, L, r, Meu and Mneu. Parameters are
α, ß, θ, a, b, c, d, δ, ε and φ.
Solving the system for the growth rate of wages yields:
In this equation, compared to that of the perfect competition case, imports are the
wˆ i e0 e2rˆ e1a
ˆM i
eu
e1b
ˆM i
neu
e3
ˆA i e4 ˆL
i
with
e0
ˆB
α(φ 1) 1 ,e2
α(φ 1)
α(φ 1) 1 ,
e1a
δ
α(φ 1) 1 ,e1b
ε
α(φ 1) 1 ,
e3
φ (β θ)
1 α β β (φ 1)
α(φ 1) 1 ,e4 1
β (φ 1)
α(φ 1) 1
exogenous variable that replace prices. The exogenous shift variable B can go either
way. If it is decreasing, competition is increased. Therefore, the demand function
is shifted towards lower prices.
Once we have estimated e0-4, we can successively infer values of α(φ+1) from
e2, ß(φ+1) from e4 and from e3. Furthermore, we can obtain the value ofφ (β θ)1 α β
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δ from e1a, that of ε from e1b, and the growth rate of B from e04. Then, we do not
get to know the sum (α+β) and whether or not a sector has increasing returns to
scale. Nevertheless, we can derive the following (sufficient) condition which, if it
is found to be larger than one, may indicate increasing returns5:
Moreover, we cannot see whether or not the price elasticity is in the (elastic)
α(φ 1) β (φ 1) φ (α β ) (α β ) > 1 ⇒ IRS
range 0 > φ > -1. What we can see, is whether δ,ε < 0 and α(φ+1),ß(φ+1) > 0
(if all the coefficient definitions hold). The restrictions follow from the requirement
of positive values for the elasticity of production and the requirement that the
inverse price elasticity should lie between zero and minus one.
3. Data and Econometric Methods
The estimated equations have been derived from the firms’ rules for cost mini-
mization and profit maximization. Unfortunately, we do not have data at the firm
or product level. Therefore, we performed the estimation at the sectoral level.
Aggregating the left and right hand sides of the equation across products to generate
a sectoral equation is possible without problems only if all products have the same
values for all the parameters or have the same growth rate of all explanatory
variables. We are not aware of any solution to this aggregation problem. Assuming
that a similar equation holds for sectors may not be too heroic. However, it is
anything but clear that the parameter constraints are still reasonable. We will
therefore estimate the equations both with and without them.
Having constructed a model that is very similar to those of standard international
trade models in textbooks we have to relate a non-monetary model to data that stem
from a monetary world. This requires dividing the data for wages and sectoral
prices by the GDP price level of the country in question. Moreover, nominal
interest rates have to be deflated by subtraction of the growth rate of the GDP
deflator. We start from national nominal interest rates, because in spite of our
assumptions it is not clear that national capital markets are perfect. Although we
have not modelled capital market imperfections explicitly, national rates seem to be
the more adequate data.
We will test for structural breaks. The question whether employment drives wages
or wages drive employment will be ’answered’ using Granger causality tests.
4 . Theoretically, this is indeed possible. In practice, since we will be solving a system of six highly
non-linear equations, there is no guarantee that either any or just one solution exists.
5 . Provided that φ is negative and α,ß > 0.
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The regression equations will be estimated by OLS6 without the aforementioned
coefficient restrictions (at least initially). This technique is applied so that a hetero-
scedasticity-consistent covariance matrix arises7. A description of the data can be
found in appendix A1. At this point, only the choice of R&D expenditures as a
proxy of technical change will be elaborated upon.
Basically, there are two sets of indicators that can serve as a proxy of technical
change: R&D data and patent statistics. However, both have their drawbacks. R&D
data are an input measure of the innovation process. Not all R&D inputs lead to
innovations, and also the efficiency with which inputs are used influences the
amount of successful R&D efforts. Thus, more R&D expenditures do not
necessarily imply more innovative activities. On the other hand, patent statistics are
an output measure of the innovation process. Not all innovations are patented, and
not all patents are put to effective and/or commercial use8. Moreover, the
propensity to patent differs between countries9. In addition, neither R&D expendi-
ture data nor patent data refer exclusively to process innovation as our model does.
At least product innovations for consumers should be excluded (but cannot).
Another problem associated with using R&D statistics as a technology indicator is
that series containing labour or capital data will mostly include, to some extent,
labour and capital used as an input to R&D. Thus, adding R&D as a separate factor
in our analysis could create a sort of ’double-counting’. However, there is mixed
evidence on both the question if and how far the consequences hereof reach. For
example, while Schankerman (1981) and Hall and Mairesse (1992) state that
corrections for double-counting should be made10, Verspagen (1995) finds only
very limited effects. We will not touch upon this issue either, assuming the bias that
arises because of double counting to be negligibly small (which seems reasonable,
given that the capital variable drops out of the regression equations)11.
Nevertheless, the decision to use R&D expenditures as a proxy of technical
change was mainly motivated by data availability, which was larger for R&D data.
6 . Applying NLS or ML (while simultaneously imposing the coefficient restriction derived in the
theoretical part) would have been an option, were it not that we would then be implying that the
coefficient restriction already holds a priori. Thus, given the reservations expressed above OLS seems
to be preferable. Pooling data (across sectors, countries or both) would have been an option too, but
it was dropped when relatively little interpretable results emerged. See also footnote 20 and 42.
7 . White’s method (1980) is used to achieve this.
8 . Scherer (1983) and Griliches (1990) examine the points in favour and against using either R&D
or patent statistics as an indicator of technical change more closely.
9 . Cf. Scherer (1983) and Feldman and Florida (1994). See Caniëls (1998) for European evidence
hereof.
10 . With the estimated return to R&D being downward biased.
11 . In appendix A1 additional remarks on this subject are made.
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4. Results and Interpretations
In section 4.1 we will discuss the estimation results for the perfect competition
model, whereafter in section 4.2 the results for the imperfect competition model are
examined.
4.1 The Case of Perfect Competition
The basic regression output is shown in appendix B112. At first, a constant term
is included in the regressions to capture the mean effect of (possibly) missing
variables (like additional productive factors). We expect γ1 and γ3 to have a
positive sign, γ2 to have a negative one, whereas γ4 and γ0 (which will be used to
denote the constant term) can have either sign. As can be seen, the constant term
is (statistically) significant at the 5% level for entire Germany, almost all of Italy
(except for textiles, footwear and leather products and the basic metals sector),
whereas it is only significant for total manufacturing and wood, cork and furniture
in France, the French, British and Spanish paper and printing industry and the
Spanish chemical industry. For the Netherlands and the US, a rather mixed picture
emerges (with chemicals, total manufacturing, stone, clay and glass and paper and
printing being the significant sectors for the Netherlands and food, drink and
tobacco, basic metals, total manufacturing, wood, cork and furniture and other
manufacturing industries for the US). Reasons for this outcome may be that labour
market aspects (like changes in union power, falling real values of the minimum
wage, an upgrading of skills and compensation policies of firms), incomplete
capacity utilization, developments in the non-traded sector, or additional production
factors (like land and natural resources) are at work (which are all not present in
our model).
Most of the other variables do have the expected signs to some degree, but are
often not significant, as is typical of the whole literature discussed above. An
exception is the labour variable, which is generally both positive and significant
(only the British food, drink and tobacco and other manufacturing industries have
a negative coefficient). This might point to increasing returns. In a situation of
perfect competition (as we have here), it would be inconsistent with our approach
for it implies the possibility of ever increasing profits. However, it is far from clear
that this is indeed the case because we will show below that we have an aggrega-
tion problem in the empirical part (which we already indicated in the theoretical
part above)13.
It is likely that there are structural breaks underlying the results. Such breaks may
especially stem from the movement from negative to positive real interest rates at
12 . Three sectors were excluded because of missing R&D data: the Dutch and Italian wood, cork
and furniture sectors and the Dutch other manufacturing industry.
13 . An alternative interpretation that is somewhat independent of our model could be that the
economy is moving along an upward sloping labour supply curve - a view often found in the work
of Bovenberg (see Bovenberg 1995 for details).
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the beginning of the 1980s14. For Great-Britain, Germany, Italy and the Nether-
lands, such a change in sign occurs in 1981. In France it occurs in 1980, whereas
in Spain and the US, a change in sign of the real interest rate takes place in 1976
and 1986 respectively. Moreover, the dollar value of 1985 may have induced
another structural break. To test for these notions, a Chow break test15 is applied
to both the aforementioned year of the sign change of the real interest rate and the
dollar value16. The results hereof are also given in appendix B1.
Only a limited number of breaks is found. They arise for total manufacturing and
wood, cork and furniture in France, the chemical industry in France and the UK,
fabricated metals products in France and Italy, leather products in Italy and the UK
and the German other manufacturing industries. Of these sectors, three seem to have
been affected by the dollar value of the mid 1980s: total manufacturing in France
and the two British sectors17. It is decided to let the estimation period for all the
aforementioned sectors start in either 1980, 1981 or 1986 instead of (mostly) 1974
and to redo the estimation. The results of this estimation process (taking into
account structural breaks) are depicted in appendix B2.
Given that we only found structural breaks for nine sectors, it does not come as
a surprise that, although there are changes to be seen (for example, a wrong change
in sign in the price variable for fabricated metals products in France and a correct
one for the interest variable for the same sector in Italy), the overall results are not
very different from those of appendix B1. Thus, structural breaks do not seem to
be at the heart of the unexpected signs and large sizes of some of the variables in
our model. Factors that remain are the significance of the constant term (in some
equations) and the fact that we have not yet imposed the coefficient restriction
derived in the theoretical part. If we leave out the constant term for those sectors
for which it is statistically insignificant at the 5% level and then test whether the
proposed restriction is in place, we obtain the results of appendix B318.
14 . From a model point of view, the period characterized by positive real interest rates is the only
one of interest, because only then the model holds. It is assumed however that when no structural
breaks are found, the influence of negative real interest rates on the regression results is negligibly
small.
15 . See Chow (1960) for details.
16 . It is reckoned that econometrically more sophisticated methods exist to assess points in time at
which structural breaks occur (see for example Gallant and Fuller 1973). However, we concentrate
on the years which we assume to be the most influential.
17 . The British chemical industry is also affected by the sign switch of the real interest rate at the
beginning of the 1980s.
18 . All regressions were also carried out with a time variable included. This variable was always
insignificantly different from zero at a 5% significance level (which is not that surprising since we
are working with series expressed in first differences).
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The omission of the constant term alters our results somewhat (leading, among
others, to several smaller (yet more significant) values of the labour variable)19,
but the overall results are quite similar to the ones already reached in appendix B2.
Besides, we see that at the 5% significance level, the coefficient restriction can be
accepted only twice. We find significant results for the British chemical industry
and Dutch fabricated metal products. Only for these sectors we may, if we get
plausible estimates for α and ß, say something about the presence of increasing
returns. It is unlikely that plausible estimates arise for both these sectors, because
not all coefficients have the expected sign: for chemicals in the UK the labour
coefficient is one of the few negative entries, whereas for fabricated metals products
in the Netherlands the interest variable turns up with a positive coefficient. In fact,
inferring values for α, ß and θ does not lead to plausible estimates for any of these
two sectors (α equals either -.010 or .019, ß -.083 or 1.71 and θ -.011 or .430)20.
Together with the theoretical part this indicates the presence of an aggregation
problem (or omitted variables).
Of all variables, labour is for a large part significantly different from zero,
whereas especially for the price and interest variables, there are many unexpected
entries as far as sign and significance are concerned. However, statements about
increasing or decreasing returns to scale cannot be made anymore since the
restriction that would give rise to such an outcome is not accepted (and in the cases
where it is, unrealistic estimates follow). It can only be said that a significant and
mostly positive relationship exists between sectoral wage growth and employment
growth in almost all sectors and countries under consideration21. One might
suggest that specific factors matter, although the less plausible results for the other
variables possibly overstates the importance of such a conclusion.
The question remains in what direction the relationship between employment and
wages holds. Do wages determine employment or does employment determine
wages instead? Tentatively, this question will be ’answered’ by means of Granger
causality tests.
19 . The technology variable now has the desired sign more often and (especially) becomes more
significant. This might point to the fact that R&D expenditures are rather flawed an indicator of
technical change. However, putting the technology variable into the residual would then again seem
too drastic an action for it would, in a statistical sense, lead to omitted variable bias.
20 . If all coefficient definitions given in the theoretical part are substituted into the regression
equation and the model is re-estimated by means of NLS, these α, ß and θ estimates follow. Of
course, it would have been preferable to solve the system numerically. This did not yield any result,
for then it is implicitly assumed that the imposed coefficient restriction holds exactly, whereas our test
examines whether it holds within a certain margin.
21 . Exceptions (with respect to significance) are all British sectors except textiles, footwear and
leather products, stone, clay and glass, paper and printing and wood, cork and furniture, the French
food, drink and tobacco, stone, clay and glass and other manufacturing industries, food, drink and
tobacco in the Netherlands and Spain and the Dutch basic metals sector.
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Granger causality tests22 examine whether the occurrence of a certain event
(variable) X precedes the occurrence of another event (variable) Y over a certain
period of time. Stated differently, it is tested whether variable Y is temporally
dependent upon variable X. Thus, it is not causality in a strict sense that is analyzed
here: it is the order in which events happen that matters23. Besides, Granger
causality is like a two-way street: only when X Granger causes Y, and Y does not
(at the same time) Granger cause X, we may say that there is temporal dependence
of Y upon X. More specifically, the following model is estimated:
where p,q = predetermined lag orders,
Yt δ 0 pαpYt p qβ qXt q εt,
εt = random disturbance term.
The null hypothesis that X does not Granger cause Y is that ßq = 0 ∀ q (while
simultaneously, Y should not Granger cause X: αp = 0 ∀ p). The size of p and q is
mostly agreed upon a priori on theoretical grounds. Here, we will assume, letting
Yt denote sectoral wage growth and Xt the corresponding growth of labour, that p
and q range from one to three. Tests were carried out with both one and two lags,
but this did not alter our basic results very much. Results are presented in appendix
B4.
Employment Granger causes wage growth in a limited number of cases: only for
the British fabricated metal products and the food, drink and tobacco sector
significant results are found (at a 5% level of significance). However, wages
determine employment growth more often: for three British sectors (chemicals,
textiles, footwear and leather products and basic metals) this turns out to be the
case. Two other significant results emerge, namely for Spanish leather products and
the Italian paper and printing industry. For wood, cork and furniture in Germany
and total manufacturing in Great-Britain, there are statistically significant relation-
ships in both directions: wages determine employment and by the same token,
employment determines wages. Nevertheless, the conclusion in these cases is the
same as for all sectors not mentioned: the Granger causality test is inconclusive.
It is quite interesting that when significant results are found, they occur most
often for Great-Britain. There seems to be no apparent reason for this outcome
though.
In the 5 cases where wages Granger cause employment growth, the estimation is
redone, with wage growth now being an explanatory variable and labour growth the
dependent one. As far as the value of the coefficients is concerned, this simply
22 . First introduced by Granger (1969). Sims (1972) and others provided tests (mostly) along the
same lines, but the Granger causality test is the one most commonly used.
23 . See Eels (1991) for a more elaborate analysis hereof.
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means rewriting the equations already shown in appendix B324. However, the fit
does change, as does the significance of the coefficients. Tests for structural breaks
have to be redone too. Also in the first stage, a constant term is included in the
regression equation. For the sectors for which it does not differ significantly from
zero at the 5% level of significance25, it is dropped and the modified model is re-
estimated. These ’final’ regressions are given in appendix B4.
Note that the desired sign of the explanatory variables switches when moving
from wage growth to labour growth as the dependent variable. Only for the
relationship between wages and labour it remains the same. Even then, there are
many wrong signs to be found26. The interest variable does not have the correct
sign for any sector. The technology variable has the wrong sign for three sectors:
chemicals in the UK and textiles, footwear and leather products in both the UK and
Spain. The price variable has the wrong sign for the two non-British sectors. Thus
there is no sector for which all variables have the desired sign. Therefore, no new
insights on coefficients are created here either27.
For those sectors where all coefficients have the expected sign28, it might be
illuminating to examine how far the explanatory variables attribute to the explana-
24 . Note that it is not necessary to test the validity of the derived coefficient restriction again
because of the same reason (as long as the estimation period remains the same). Here, we have to
perform this test anew for two sectors: chemicals and leather products in the UK. For the latter sector,
the coefficient restriction is accepted, so estimates for α, ß and θ can be generated. See also footnote
27.
25 . As turned out to be the case for British and Spanish textiles, footwear and leather products and
the Italian paper and printing industry.
26 . Which is not surprising since coefficients that already had the wrong sign when wages were
taken as the dependent variable, will have so now too (as long as the constant term remains either
absent or present and the estimation period remains the same).
27 . This is the reason why we find no reasonable estimates for α, ß, θ in case of leather products
in the UK (where we did accept the coefficient restriction): α equals 2.93 10-3, ß 1.50 and θ -.128.
See also footnote 24.
28 . We will only look at cases where employment determines wage growth, because in the reverse
situation no sector had all the desired signs. If we had reversed the position of the wage and labour
variables in the regression equation and redone the entire analysis up to this point, we would have
ended up with 10 sectors to work with (instead of the 17 we have now). Interestingly, 7 out of these
sectors are located in the US: chemicals, fabricated metal products, food, drink and tobacco, leather
products, basic metals, wood, cork and furniture and total manufacturing. The other sectors are paper
and printing in the UK, wood, cork and furniture in France and other manufacturing industries in
Spain. Compared to the 17 sectors we find here (see table 4.1 below), we have an overlap for 5
sectors: three American (chemicals, basic metals and wood, cork and furniture), one French (chemi-
cals) and a British one (paper and printing). So if we include both relationships (where labour growth
determines wage growth and vice versa), we would have 22 sectors to continue with. Results at the
sectoral level are discussed below.
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tion (of variation in) the dependent variable29. This means conducting a sort of
’growth accounting’ exercise. From appendix B3 we see that there are 17 sectors
for which we found the expected signs. None of them is located in Germany. All
sectors are shown in table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1 Sectors with correct expected signs.
Country Sector
USA Chemicals
Basic metals
Paper and printing
Wood, cork and furniture
France Chemicals
Stone, clay and glass
Wood, cork and furniture
Great-Britain Chemicals
Food, drink and tobacco
Paper and printing
Other manufacturing industries
Netherlands Total manufacturing
Italy Textiles, footwear and leather
Spain Basic metals
Food, drink and tobacco
Total manufacturing
Wood, cork and furniture
Except for chemicals, most industries in the table above are the more traditional
ones. Perhaps they indeed exhibit cost-minimizing behaviour because of the nature
of their activities.
The basic procedure we follow for the 17 sectors where all variables have the
expected signs is to take the regression coefficients of appendix B3 and to pre-
multiply them by the means of the corresponding explanatory variables (calculated
as an average of the entire estimation period)30. Then, this figure is divided by the
mean of the dependent variable over the same period and multiplied by 100 to
arrive at percentages. Finally, to obtain country figures, unweighted means of these
percentages are taken for all sectors in table 4.1 within a certain country.
29 . Ideally, we would have preferred looking at variables that have both the expected sign and are
statistically significant. However, this is not the case for any sector. Since we do want to give an
indication whether either terms of trade or technology drives wage growth most, the present approach
is opted for.
30 . Alternatively, we could have taken medians or calculated an average based on just the first and
last period. However, given the way in which the OLS estimates are obtained, calculating means over
the entire estimation period is to be preferred.
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If we leave out total manufacturing31, and check the relative importance of all
variables in explaining wage growth in a certain country in the way described
above, we reach the results presented in table 4.2. For Italy no results at the country
level are calculated because of the availability of just one sector.
Table 4.2 Relative importance of explanatory variables in explaining per
country wage growth (in percentages)32.
VARIABLE Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Labour (%) Residual
(%)
COUNTRY
USA 19.7 16.9 -3.1 -3.5 57.5 12.3
France 0.0 28.8 30.9 -3.0 79.7 -36.4
Great-Britain 40.7 23.8 -18.3 31.8 16.6 5.4
Netherlands 422.7 64.4 8.7 -6.3 -389.5 0.0
Spain 0.0 22.5 19.8 -6.7 55.8 8.7
Perhaps the first impression table 4.2 gives rise to, is that a large part of the
explanation of wage growth is attributed to both the constant term (in the UK and
the Netherlands) and the residual (in France). This implies that for these countries
a significant part of wage behaviour is not captured by our model as discussed
above33.
However, it does not mean that we cannot draw any conclusion from the table
(at least, preliminary). It is evident that for most countries, a large part of wage
growth is determined by employment growth: labour supply is a dominating factor
in 4 countries (all but the UK). In the UK, a substantial part is contributed by terms
of trade changes34. The UK is also the only country where terms of trade are more
influential than technology. Looking at the overall results, we may conclude that
technology is a more important factor than trade in determining (national) wages
in 4 countries. Labour supply is an even more important factor. Again, specific
31 . For it is an aggregate across all other sectors and including it would create a bias. In case of the
Netherlands however, it will be included to give at least some notion of Dutch wage behaviour.
32 . In regressions without a constant term the residuals do not necessarily have to sum to zero.
Therefore, a certain weight is assigned to them in these cases.
33 . Which was to be expected, given our previous results.
34 . Leaving aside the constant term.
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factors seem to matter. This raises the question what we can see at the sectoral
level35.
We can derive from table 4.3a below36 for the whole period under consideration
(and from table 4.3b for the 1980s onwards -the results of which we will indicate
between brackets-) that 12 (12) out of the 17 sectors included in the ’growth
accounting’ exercise have negative terms of trade growth, indicating that there may
be an international problem. In 7 (7) sectors we have falling and in 10 (10) we have
increasing wages (according to the last column). In only 4 (4) sectors R&D
expenditures have a negative growth rate. R&D therefore has a positive effect on
wages in both periods. Interest rates have fallen in 10 (10) sectors and therefore
have increased wage growth37. With 2 (3) exceptions labour supply has fallen and
therefore -given the positive sign of the correlation- decreased wage growth. The
earlier period thus is a bit less favourable as far as the growth rate of the labour
supply is concerned38.
35 . A similar exercise was carried out for the period starting (mostly) from 1980 or 1981 onwards.
There, we looked at sectors which had (by and large) falling growth rates of wages. With the same
regression coefficients (which, in a rough sense, is a valid approach for structural breaks have already
been taken into account), we found results that were almost identical to the ones obtained in table 4.2.
However, the results for total manufacturing in the Netherlands and food, drink and tobacco in Spain
became worse, with respectively -123.9% and -325.1% of wage growth now being attributed to the
residual. On the contrary, we found improved results for France, where technology now emerged as
the most prominent factor in wage determination. Moreover, in Spain capital became the most
important explanatory factor. Yet overall, labour still turned out to be the most influential factor in
national wage formation. More results at the sectoral level are discussed (and shown) later on.
36 . Of course, the same data can also be found in appendix A2.
37 . The extremely high value for the mean growth rate of the Spanish interest rate is due to an
outlier in 1986. Possibly, this outlier is caused by the alliance of Spain with the EU (and it was
therefore explicitly taken along in our exercises).
38 . In 7 (7) cases the growth rates of L and w have opposite signs, but have positive regression
coefficients. The inclusion of other explanatory variables and interaction effects between them play
an important role in this ’switch’ in sign.
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Table 4.3a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL.
Sector39 SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
USAZ35 74-93 0.0455 0.3643 -0.0019 0.0063 0.0179
USAZMB 74-93 -0.0049 0.3643 0.0015 -0.0286 -0.0222
USAZOP 74-93 0.0522 0.3643 0.0052 0.0108 0.0179
USAZOW 74-93 0.0209 0.3643 -0.0056 0.0000 0.0046
FRAZOG 74-91 0.0215 0.5437 0.0010 -0.0244 -0.0037
FRAZ35 80-91 0.0458 -0.2758 -0.0079 -0.0060 0.0030
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
GBRZLF 74-92 -0.0886 0.2590 -0.0047 -0.0212 0.0046
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.0019 0.2590 0.0359 -0.0253 0.0209
GBRZOP 74-92 -0.0022 0.2590 0.0060 -0.0101 0.0107
GBRZ35 86-92 0.0692 0.4908 -0.0210 -0.0070 0.0264
NLDZMT 74-93 0.0187 -0.2920 -0.0095 -0.0123 0.0028
ESPZMB 80-91 0.0173 -9.5446 -0.0339 -0.0399 -0.0323
ESPZMT 80-91 0.1139 -9.5446 -0.0089 -0.0138 -0.0078
ESPZOW 80-91 0.5935 -9.5446 -0.0047 -0.0189 -0.0173
ESPZLF 80-91 0.1110 -9.5446 -0.0188 -0.0085 0.0092
ITAZLX 81-94 0.3001 0.1873 -0.0176 -0.0197 -0.0107
39 . See appendix A1 for the abbreviations used.
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Table 4.3b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
USAZ35 81-93 0.0508 0.1435 -0.0153 0.0037 0.0143
USAZMB 81-93 -0.0311 0.1435 -0.0244 -0.0377 -0.0371
USAZOP 81-93 0.0500 0.1435 0.0083 0.0108 0.0214
USAZOW 81-93 0.0179 0.1435 -0.0023 0.0052 0.0091
FRAZOG 80-91 0.0234 -0.2758 -0.0023 -0.0279 -0.0129
FRAZ35 80-91 0.0458 -0.2758 -0.0079 -0.0060 0.0030
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
GBRZLF 81-92 -0.0581 0.1612 0.0040 -0.0276 0.0052
GBRZOO 81-92 -0.0646 0.1612 0.0546 -0.0285 0.0417
GBRZOP 81-92 -0.0018 0.1612 0.0034 -0.0138 0.0153
GBRZ35 86-92 0.0692 0.4908 -0.0210 -0.0070 0.0264
NLDZMT 81-93 0.0209 0.0287 0.0030 -0.0072 0.0034
ESPZMB 81-91 0.0116 -10.2546 -0.0367 -0.0449 -0.0410
ESPZMT 81-91 0.1085 -10.2546 -0.0162 -0.0138 -0.0134
ESPZOW 81-91 0.6157 -10.2546 -0.0124 -0.0182 -0.0265
ESPZLF 81-91 0.0940 -10.2546 -0.0200 -0.0063 0.0016
ITAZLX 81-94 0.3001 0.1873 -0.0176 -0.0197 -0.0107
From table 4.4a below (and table 4.4b for the more recent period of the 1980s -
the results of which are again given between brackets-), containing a similar table
as table 4.2 but then at the sectoral level, it follows that in 5 (8) out of the 17
sectors terms of trade have a larger impact than technology. This means that
technology matters more often over the whole period but terms of trade changes are
more influential in the recent period. Out of these 5 (8) sectors, 2 (4) have falling
terms of trade. Thus at the sectoral level international trade is quite important.
These 2 sectors are located in Spain (basic metals) and the UK (food, drink and
tobacco). In the 1980s more Spanish sectors have terms of trade losses but also one
sector in the US (basic metals). However, of the 2 (4) sectors 1 (4) have falling
wages. The more recent period therefore is (much) less favourable (in terms of
losses) than the whole period and the terms of trade are overtaking technology in
importance40.
40 . This conclusion is independent of the fact that, for some sectors (for example, wood, cork and
furniture in France) a large part of wage growth is explained by the residual. Even if we had included
a constant term in the regressions for these sectors anyway (and checked whether all variables had
the correct signs), the economic interpretation of the results would have remained virtually the same.
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In 11 (12) of the 17 national sectors labour has the strongest impact; in only 4
(4) cases it is technology and in 2 (1) it is trade. In the more recent period labour
has become even more important than it already was over the entire period. When
counting variables that rank second we find 6 (6) times technology, 2 (6) times
trade, 3 (2) times labour and 6 (3) times capital movements by interest changes.
The overall impression therefore is that labour supply matters most, technology
second and trade and interest rates last (in that order), but in the more recent period
terms of trade are catching up with technology. All evaluations have been made
without taking the constant term or the residual into account.
Table 4.4a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages).
Sector Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Labour (%) Residual (%)
USAZ35 0.0 53.3 -2.5 -0.4 30.0 19.7
USAZMB -38.8 1.0 2.8 -0.4 135.4 0.0
USAZOP 0.0 4.7 -2.5 3.0 65.1 29.6
USAZOW 117.7 8.8 -10.0 -16.0 -0.5 0.0
FRAZOG 0.0 -72.8 86.4 -13.6 251.7 -151.7
FRAZ35 0.0 198.8 49.5 -6.4 -121.7 -20.1
FRAZOW 0.0 -10.8 -12.3 8.1 188.8 -73.7
GBRZLF 0.0 -17.7 -6.5 -5.9 107.4 22.7
GBRZOO 0.0 -0.9 -6.4 120.4 7.6 -20.8
GBRZOP 162.8 -2.0 -12.2 24.0 -72.5 0.0
GBRZ35 0.0 115.8 -48.2 -11.2 23.8 19.9
NLDZMT 422.7 64.4 8.7 -6.3 -389.5 0.0
ESPZMB 0.0 -1.6 -3.5 7.3 109.9 -12.2
ESPZMT 0.0 -67.4 -3.4 42.8 151.4 -23.4
ESPZOW 0.0 -12.5 -1.1 8.0 90.4 15.2
ESPZLF 0.0 81.5 63.9 -35.5 -32.8 23.0
ITAZLX 0.0 -5.3 3.2 4.8 109.0 -11.8
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Table 4.4b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages) - from the
1980s onwards.
Sector Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Labour (%) Residual
(%)
USAZ35 0.0 74.4 -1.3 -4.1 21.9 9.0
USAZMB -23.2 3.7 0.7 4.1 106.5 8.2
USAZOP 0.0 3.8 -0.8 4.0 54.4 38.7
USAZOW 59.2 3.8 -2.0 -3.4 56.9 -14.5
FRAZOG 0.0 -22.8 -12.6 8.8 83.0 43.6
FRAZ35 0.0 198.8 49.5 -6.4 -121.7 -20.1
FRAZOW 0.0 -10.8 -12.3 8.1 188.8 -73.7
GBRZLF 0.0 -10.3 -3.6 4.4 124.2 -14.7
GBRZOO 0.0 -14.7 -2.0 91.8 4.3 20.6
GBRZOP 113.9 -1.2 -5.3 9.6 -69.4 52.4
GBRZ35 0.0 115.8 -48.2 -11.2 23.8 19.9
NLDZMT 353.2 60.0 -0.7 1.7 -190.3 -123.9
ESPZMB 0.0 -0.8 -2.9 6.3 97.6 -0.2
ESPZMT 0.0 -37.6 -2.1 45.6 88.7 5.4
ESPZOW 0.0 -8.5 -0.7 13.8 56.8 38.6
ESPZLF 0.0 387.6 385.6 -212.0 -136.2 -325.1
ITAZLX 0.0 -5.3 3.2 4.8 109.0 -11.8
A similar exercise can be carried out by switching the roles of wage and labour
growth in the regression equation and redoing the entire analysis up to this point41.
Then we would find 10 sectors where all variables have the expected signs (5 of
which had not been included before), as shown in table 4.5 below.
41 . No regression outputs or intermediate results are included for the reversed relationship. However,
they can be obtained from one of the authors upon request.
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Table 4.5 Sectors with correct expected signs when the roles of labour and
wages are interchanged.
Country Sector
USA Chemicals
Fabricated metal products
Food, drink and tobacco
Textiles, footwear and leather products
Basic metals
Total manufacturing
Wood, cork and furniture
France Wood, cork and furniture
Great-Britain Paper and printing
Spain Other manufacturing industries
Because the majority of the sectors is located in the US (7 out of 10) we might
conclude, given the relationship we are studying right now that especially for the
US the current specification works quite well (as far as the signs of the variables
are concerned).
It is interesting to see what proportion of labour growth is explained by the other
variables like we did before. At the national level a result can only be presented for
the US, for there is too limited an amount of sectors accepted for the other
countries. Table 4.6 lists the relevant statistics.
Table 4.6 Relative importance of explanatory variables in explaining per
country wage growth (in percentages).
VARIABLE Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Wages (%) Residual
(%)
COUNTRY
USA 71.1 523.1 -209.9 -167.1 -3251.2 3133.9
USA (excl.
ZOW)
85.3 -9.1 -2.3 -16.4 20.1 22.5
Looking at table 4.6, the large percentages we find for all variables besides the
constant term indicate that there may be an outlier between the sectors at hand. This
is indeed the case for wood, cork and furniture. Dropping this sector yields the
result that the most important variable in determining labour growth in the US is
wage growth (leaving aside the constant term and the residual). Trade, technology
and capital all play a less important role (in that order).
Again, at the sectoral level some insights can be gained by analyzing both the
periods starting from the 1970s and the 1980s. Therefore, in table 4.7a and 4.7b the
growth rates for the variables under consideration are shown for these periods.
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Table 4.7a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
GBRZOP 74-92 -0.0022 0.2590 0.0060 -0.0101 0.0107
USAZ38 74-93 0.0126 0.3643 -0.0157 -0.0036 0.0062
USAZLX 74-93 0.0320 0.3643 -0.0265 -0.0199 -0.0145
USAZMB 74-93 -0.0049 0.3643 0.0015 -0.0286 -0.0222
USAZMT 74-93 0.0187 0.3643 -0.0085 -0.0045 0.0047
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
USAZ35 74-93 0.0455 0.3643 -0.0019 0.0063 0.0179
USAZLF 74-93 0.0294 0.3643 0.0023 -0.0020 0.0048
USAZOW 74-93 0.0209 0.3643 -0.0056 0.0000 0.0046
ESPZOO 80-91 0.5407 -9.5446 -0.0489 -0.0129 0.0017
Table 4.7b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital Trade Labour Wages
GBRZOP 81-92 -0.0018 0.1612 0.0034 -0.0138 0.0153
USAZ38 81-93 0.0081 0.1435 -0.0216 -0.0123 0.0001
USAZLX 81-93 0.0470 0.1435 -0.0207 -0.0197 -0.0104
USAZMB 81-93 -0.0311 0.1435 -0.0244 -0.0377 -0.0371
USAZMT 81-93 0.0158 0.1435 -0.0137 -0.0083 0.0013
FRAZOW 80-91 0.0779 -0.2758 -0.0051 -0.0235 -0.0082
USAZ35 81-93 0.0508 0.1435 -0.0153 0.0037 0.0143
USAZLF 81-93 0.0241 0.1435 0.0102 -0.0019 0.0033
USAZOW 81-93 0.0179 0.1435 -0.0023 0.0052 0.0091
ESPZOO 81-91 0.5679 -10.2546 -0.0707 -0.0107 -0.0067
A general conclusion that can be drawn when comparing the two tables is that
the period of the 1980s is less favourable in many respects: for example, more
sectors suffer from adverse terms of trade (8 instead of 7) and wage growth (4
instead of 3). Although R&D growth is larger in the 1980s than in the 1970s for
some sectors (paper and printing in the UK, chemicals in the US and other
manufacturing industries in Spain), it mostly is smaller than in the earlier period.
Even with a slightly different set of sectors, we thus reach the same general result
as we did when studying the reversed relationship.
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Table 4.8a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages).
Sector Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Wages (%) Residual (%)
GBRZOP 112.9 -0.6 -1.6 20.1 -30.8 0.0
USAZ38 337.3 8.0 -14.7 -62.8 -167.9 0.0
USAZLX 54.9 5.1 -0.7 -22.3 63.1 0.0
USAZMB 34.5 -0.8 -1.8 0.2 67.9 0.0
USAZMT 205.8 11.6 -8.5 -9.1 -99.8 0.0
FRAZOW 0.0 8.7 3.8 -0.1 38.9 48.8
USAZ35 0.0 -120.0 5.8 1.7 256.0 -43.5
USAZLF 0.0 62.1 -0.2 1.0 -118.9 155.9
USAZOW 0.0 3184.2 -1247.8 -920.2 -19607.3 18691.2
ESPZOO 0.0 45.4 5.3 -44.5 -12.4 106.3
Table 4.8b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages) - from the
1980s onwards.
Sector Constant (%) Technology
(%)
Capital (%) Trade (%) Wages (%) Residual (%)
GBRZOP 82.6 -0.4 -0.7 8.4 -32.2 42.3
USAZ38 99.7 1.5 -1.7 -25.6 -0.7 26.9
USAZLX 55.6 7.5 -0.3 -17.7 45.6 9.2
USAZMB 26.2 -4.0 -0.5 -2.1 86.4 -6.0
USAZMT 110.7 5.2 -1.8 -7.8 -14.8 8.5
FRAZOW 0.0 8.7 3.8 -0.1 38.9 48.8
USAZ35 0.0 -229.0 3.9 23.8 349.8 -48.5
USAZLF 0.0 53.6 -0.1 4.8 -86.1 127.8
USAZOW 0.0 -11.4 2.1 1.6 163.5 -55.7
ESPZOO 0.0 57.7 6.8 -77.8 59.0 54.3
Table 4.8a (and table 4.8b for the 1980s - the results of which we will again
present between brackets) is a sectoral version of table 4.5 (but now for all
countries). We can derive from it that in 3 (5) of the 10 sectors terms of trade have
a larger influence on labour growth than technology. Technology thus matters more
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over the whole period, but since the 1980s the terms of trade have gained in
importance. This conclusion is in accordance with the one we obtained above.
In 9 (8) of the sectors wages have the largest impact. Technology comes first 1
(0) times, whereas capital and terms of trade hold the first position 0 (0) and 0 (2)
times respectively. The influence of the terms of trade on labour growth thus has
grown over time. When counting the variables that rank second, we get 5 (5) times
technology, 4 (3) times trade, 1 (1) time capital movements and 0 (1) times wages.
It will by now not come as a surprise that similar results as above are reached.
Wage growth is the most dominant factor is explaining labour growth, with
technology in second place, trade third and capital last. The roles of technology and
trade switch when looking at the more recent period of the 1980s.
We already stated that the perfect competition version of our model leaves
something to be desired for increasing returns cannot be excluded. Yet, despite its
deficiencies, it is clear that its results are quite robust: specific factors do indeed
seem to matter for wage and/or labour growth, whereas the influence of the terms
of trade on the results has risen over time (when set against the role of technology).
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that there still is a need to analyze an imperfect
competition version of the model.
4.2 The Case of Imperfect Competition
The approach that is followed in case of imperfect competition is very similar to
the one followed in the perfect competition case. We first ran OLS regressions42
on the basic model, which -from a theoretical point of view- now already contains
a constant term. As long as α ≤ 1 and φ is in the elastic range 0 > φ > -1, we
expect e1a and e1b to have a negative sign, while e0, e3 and e4 can have either sign
(although e3 is highly likely to be positive). The results of the estimations are
shown in appendix B5.
We see that the constant term (e0) differs significantly from zero at the 5%
significance level only 19 times. These are all positive entries. Negative entries turn
up only 10 times. A similar conclusion holds with respect to the coefficients of the
import variables (e1a and e1b): the coefficient for EU-imports differs significantly
from zero 5 times, which are all positive entries but two. It has the desired sign 29
times. Non-European imports turn up significantly 9 times (of which three entries
are negative), with a total of 27 negative signs. Thus, non-European imports,
including those of the Asian NICs, may have a substantial impact on wage growth
in some sectors. Given the construction of e1a and e1b, they should have the same
sign. This happens only 22 times.
Technology is significant only 5 times (of which two entries are negative), and
has a positive sign 46 times. The interest rate turns up significantly 11 times too,
with seven negative coefficients. Negative signs occur 29 times in total.
42 . NLS and ML regressions were also tried (with either the results from the OLS regressions or
zero as starting values), but this yielded hardly any result (convergence only occurred when running
NLS regressions from zero. If we had continued with these figures, the results presented below would
remain roughly the same).
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Labour again is by far the most significant variable. It turns up so 51 times this
time. All significant entries are positive ones; negative entries occur only 4 times.
Given the highly non-linear way in which α, ß and θ appear in the expressions of
e0-4, we cannot conclude whether there are increasing returns to scale or not. Yet,
we can say something about this later on when we analyze the sufficient condition
put forward in the theoretical part.
As compared to the results presented in appendix B1, it is striking that for many
sectors the fit improves: the imperfect-competition version of our model thus picks
up some factors that were (unjustly) left out at the perfect competition stage.
In sum, we may state that for the larger part of the sectors the assumption that
α ≤ 1 probably does not hold. Although in principle the violation of the assumption
does not pose a big problem per se43, it may again be that there are structural
breaks underlying the results. Therefore, we performed a Chow structural break test
for (mostly) the years 1981 and 1986 and checked whether such breaks were
present44.
Structural breaks were found for 9 sectors: four British (chemicals, food, drink
and tobacco, leather products and total manufacturing), one American (basic
metals), two Italian (chemicals and fabricated metal products) and two Dutch ones
(basic metals and total manufacturing). For only three of them, we also found
structural breaks in the perfect competition case45. The estimation for these sectors
was redone, with the estimation period now mostly starting in 198646. The revised
regression results are presented in appendix B6. Note that the results are split into
two groups: the cases where employment growth determines wage growth and the
cases where wage growth determines employment growth47.
43 . As long as α(φ+1) ≤ 1 (as indicated in section 2). Yet, the ’conflict’ in sign between the two
import variables may lead us to the conclusion that even the current specification leaves something
to be desired. Do note however, that this sign ’conflict’ may be due to multicollinearity: the two
import variables have a correlation that is mostly larger than .60 (and often exceeds .80). Although
there are solutions to multicollinearity (for example, dropping one of the collinear variables), this is
not an option in the present context for it would imply an explicit change of the theoretical model.
44 . Why these years were chosen has been set out in section 4.1.
45 . These sectors are the British chemical and leather products industries and Italian fabricated metal
products.
46 . Exceptions are the British food, drink and tobacco sector and the Italian chemical and Dutch
basic metal industries. For these sectors the estimation period started in 1981 instead of 1986.
47 . The results of Granger causality tests in appendix B4 are still valid. For the sectors where we
found structural breaks, this implies that in two British cases (chemicals and leather products) labour
is taken as the independent variable and wages as an explanatory one, and the entire estimation
procedure has to be redone (including testing for structural breaks). So in effect, the structural break
tests that were carried out change the results for only seven sectors instead of nine.
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Some changes occur for the aforementioned sectors. We find both correct sign
switches (for example in case of the interest variable for Italian chemicals, the
European import variable for total manufacturing in the Netherlands and its non-
European counterpart for basic metals in the US and the Netherlands), coupled with
incorrect ones - sometimes even within the same sectors (for example in case of the
interest and non-European import variable for total manufacturing in the Nether-
lands and also the latter variable for total manufacturing in the UK). So overall, no
very new insights on coefficients are created here either.
Nevertheless, it remains quite difficult to be more specific about the results
without actually knowing the values of the parameters α, ß, δ, ε, θ, φ and .ˆB
Therefore, we put the estimated coefficients of the imperfect-competition model in
the general expressions depicted in the theoretical part, and solve the system of
equations we get for e0-4 numerically. To ensure that we have a system of six
equations for six unknowns (which hopefully can be solved), α(φ+1), ß(φ+1) and φ (β θ)
1 α β
are taken as single coefficients. The outcome of this procedure is shown in appen-
dix B7.
We may recall from section 2 that there are several conditions which have to hold
in order to fulfill the requirements of the model. These conditions are that δ,ε < 0
and that α(φ+1),ß(φ+1) > 0. If we look at the 62 sectors for which labour growth
explains wage growth, we find that δ is smaller than zero 32 times, while ε is so
even 38 times. However, when taken together they are negative only 14 times. A
similar conclusion is reached for the α(φ+1) and ß(φ+1) terms: the first one is
almost always positive (in 59 out of 62 cases)48, while the latter is positive 34
times. But together they have a positive value on just 32 occasions. The growth rate
of the exogenous shift variable B receives a negative value 28 times, indicating that
in about half of our cases the demand function is indeed shifted towards lower
prices.
Combining the results for δ, ε, α(φ+1) and ß(φ+1), we find that only 5 sectors
fulfill all requirements: total manufacturing in the US, paper and printing and
fabricated metal products in the Netherlands, the British other manufacturing
industries and food, drink and tobacco in Spain. For all these sectors we may even
conclude that increasing returns to scale are at work, for the sum of α(φ+1) and
ß(φ+1) ranges between 1.18 and 4.1449. When we only look at the question
whether there are increasing returns, our sufficient condition tells us that this is the
case for 39 sectors. Especially in the US and the Netherlands increasing returns are
found. On the contrary, we find (much) less evidence of increasing returns in the
48 . With stone, clay and glass in Italy and leather products and food, drink and tobacco in France
as the exceptions.
49 . The values for total manufacturing in the US (4.14) and paper and printing in the Netherlands
(3.43) are somewhat improbable however.
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UK and Germany50. Mneu depresses prices as much as Meu if we look at the 14
cases where both δ and ε are negative (δ > ε 7 times). Imports from the Asian
NICs thus seem to have no larger impact on wages than imports from the EU.
For the 5 sectors where we accepted all requirements a similar ’growth accoun-
ting’ exercise as in the previous section can be conducted. No such exercise will be
conducted at the national level however, since we have too little observations
available within every country to do so. Growth rates at the sectoral level are
presented in table 4.9a (for the whole period) and 4.9b (for the period starting from
the 1980s). Again, they yield the same conclusion reached in the perfect competi-
tion case: the period of the 1980s is less favourable in almost all respects. Most
variables have smaller growth rates in the later period (maybe except for the labour
variable, where 3 out of 5 sectors have larger growth rates).
Table 4.9a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
USAZMT 74-92 0.0227 0.3942 0.0434 0.0671 -0.0047 0.0041
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.0019 0.2590 0.1049 0.0200 -0.0253 0.0209
NLDZOP 74-92 0.0106 -0.2976 0.0587 0.0363 0.0012 0.0160
NLDZ38 74-92 0.0153 -0.2976 0.0354 0.0677 -0.0099 0.0037
ESPZLF 80-91 0.1110 -9.5446 0.1244 0.0275 -0.0085 0.0092
Table 4.9b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
USAZMT 81-92 0.0218 0.1724 0.0395 0.0551 -0.0090 0.0001
GBRZOO 81-92 -0.0646 0.1612 0.0443 -0.0061 -0.0285 0.0417
NLDZOP 81-92 0.0146 0.0464 0.0480 0.0350 0.0041 0.0182
NLDZ38 81-92 0.0177 0.0464 0.0440 0.0778 -0.0061 0.0033
ESPZLF 81-91 0.0940 -10.2546 0.1363 0.0556 -0.0063 0.0016
The final growth accounting results for both periods are given in table 4.10a and
4.10b below. What we see (indicating the results for the 1980s between brackets),
50 . Exceptions are food, drink and tobacco in both the UK and Germany and paper and printing,
stone, clay and glass and other manufacturing industries in the UK.
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is that wage growth is dominated by labour growth in all but 2 sectors (other
manufacturing industries in the UK and food, drink and tobacco in Spain in both
periods). There, twice EU trade (technology and non-EU trade) are the most
important. In answering the question whether technology or trade (EU and non-EU)
drive wage growth most, we find 1 (2) times technology and 4 (3) times trade. Thus
for the above sectors the roles of technology and trade are reversed as compared to
the case of perfect competition: now technology (instead of trade) is more important
during the 1980s. However, this may be caused by a kind of ’selection bias’. After
all, we are analyzing just 5 sectors. When looking at variables that rank in second
place, we find 1 (1) time technology, 2 (3) times trade, 1 (1) labour and 1 (0)
capital movements. Overall, technology seems to have gained in importance over
time, the influence of trade has become slightly less whereas labour matters most
here too.
Table 4.10a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages).
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade
(%)
Labour
(%)
Residual
(%)
USAZMT 74-92 200.5 50.2 -14.6 -13.7 -9.8 -112.7 0.0
GBRZOO 74-92 38.9 1.1 0.6 25.1 10.6 23.6 0.0
NLDZOP 74-92 101.3 -0.3 -1.9 -6.3 -0.3 7.6 0.0
NLDZ38 74-92 544.7 19.8 21.0 -74.4 -116.5 -294.6 0.0
ESPZLF 80-91 125.5 64.3 99.8 -99.9 -66.8 -22.9 0.0
Table 4.10b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector wage growth (in percentages) - from the
1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade
(%)
Labour
(%)
Residual
(%)
USAZMT 81-92 9514.0 2287.5 -302.2 -589.7 -384.0 -10226.1 -199.5
GBRZOO 81-92 19.4 18.8 0.2 5.3 -1.6 13.3 44.5
NLDZOP 81-92 89.1 -0.3 0.3 -4.5 -0.3 23.0 -7.3
NLDZ38 81-92 625.4 26.3 -3.8 -106.0 -153.6 -206.5 -81.8
ESPZLF 81-91 705.2 306.1 602.7 -614.8 -760.5 -95.3 -43.3
The results for the 5 sectors for which the role of labour and wages has been
interchanged on the basis of Granger causality tests hardly alters the conclusions
reached above. Indeed, here only one sector fulfills all the previous require-
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ments: paper and printing in Italy51. Although the small number of sectors for
which all requirements are met may cast some doubt on the validity of our entire
model, we should not forget the fact that we are still -and always will be- faced
with an aggregation problem which clearly can have distorted our results (even if
the model were correct in itself).
Yet, altering the role of wage and labour growth in all equations may be an
interesting route to follow for in that way we can check the robustness of some of
the conclusions reached previously. In doing so, we find expected signs of the
parameters for 6 sectors: fabricated metal products and stone, clay and glass in
Germany, chemicals in the Netherlands and France and stone, clay and glass and
paper and printing in Italy52. We will perform another ’growth accounting’
exercise for these sectors. Table 4.11a and 4.11b list the relevant growth rates.
Table 4.11a Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
DEUZ38 74-92 0.0519 0.0733 0.0683 0.0933 0.0018 0.0260
DEUZOG 74-92 0.0684 0.0733 0.0348 0.0561 -0.0178 0.0009
FRAZ35 74-91 0.0427 0.5437 0.0641 0.0917 -0.0050 0.0187
ITAZOG 74-92 0.1193 0.6333 0.0295 0.0561 -0.0091 0.0111
ITAZOP 81-92 -0.0066 0.2304 0.0304 0.0089 -0.0119 0.0062
NLDZ35 74-92 0.0309 -0.2976 0.0528 0.0839 -0.0015 0.0141
51 . Note that in this case (as compared to the perfect competition one) we can use the same
expected signs as we did before when interpreting the results for the equations where the role of
labour and wages has been interchanged.
52 . No intermediate results will be shown here either, but they are available from one of the authors
upon request.
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Table 4.11b Growth rates of explanatory and dependent variables over the
estimation period given by SMPL - from the 1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Technology Capital EU trade Non-EU
trade
Labour Wages
DEUZ38 81-92 0.0420 0.0447 0.0672 0.0841 0.0060 0.0223
DEUZOG 81-92 0.0171 0.0447 0.0319 0.0553 -0.0138 -0.0016
FRAZ35 80-91 0.0458 -0.2758 0.0357 0.0441 -0.0060 0.0030
ITAZOG 81-92 0.0812 0.2304 0.0079 0.0276 -0.0092 0.0047
ITAZOP 81-92 -0.0066 0.2304 0.0304 0.0089 -0.0119 0.0062
NLDZ35 81-92 0.0343 0.0464 0.0256 0.0033 0.0060 0.0165
From the above growth rates we can derive that for the 6 sectors included the
recent period of the 1980s is much less favourable for all variables except
labour: they have smaller growth rates more often than over the entire period. The
mean wage growth rate for German paper and printing even becomes negative.
Thus we can reinforce the conclusions already made before. This raises the question
what we find when analyzing the impact of all variables on wage growth
(in percentages). Table 4.12a and 4.12b give an indication hereof.
Table 4.12a Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages).
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade
(%)
Wages
(%)
Residual
(%)
DEUZ38 74-92 -858.4 57.8 -35.2 -31.6 -80.6 1048.1 0.0
DEUZOG 74-92 91.0 3.5 2.3 4.8 1.6 -3.2 0.0
FRAZ35 74-91 131.0 1.1 15.9 2.1 40.9 -91.0 0.0
ITAZOG 74-92 168.3 -13.7 6.2 0.0 47.5 -108.4 0.0
ITAZOP 81-92 119.0 0.1 9.2 18.1 0.3 -46.7 0.0
NLDZ35 74-92 531.4 -80.0 2.5 65.4 38.4 -457.8 0.0
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Table 4.12b Relative importance of dependent and explanatory variables in
explaining per sector labour growth (in percentages) - from the
1980s onwards.
Sector SMPL Constant
(%)
Technology
(%)
Capital
(%)
EU
trade
(%)
Non-EU
trade
(%)
Wages
(%)
Residual
(%)
DEUZ38 81-92 -257.6 14.0 -6.4 -9.3 -21.8 270.0 111.1
DEUZOG 81-92 117.6 1.1 1.8 5.7 2.0 7.7 -35.9
FRAZ35 80-91 108.7 0.9 -6.7 1.0 16.3 -12.0 -8.3
ITAZOG 81-92 256.0 -8.0 -4.1 0.0 56.9 -44.0 -156.9
ITAZOP 81-92 119.0 0.1 9.2 18.1 0.3 -46.7 0.0
NLDZ35 81-92 -128.2 21.4 0.1 -7.7 -0.4 129.8 85.0
Even when switching the roles of labour and wages, the main conclusion remains
that specific factors matter: wage growth has the largest impact on labour growth
in 5 (4) out of 6 sectors. Only for German paper and printing (French chemicals
and Italian stone, clay and glass) it is EU trade (twice non-EU trade). Removal of
fabricated metal products in Germany (which can be regarded as an outlier) does
not change this result substantially. Trade explains a larger percentage of labour
growth than technology in all but one sector (Dutch chemicals in both periods).
Given that non-EU trade sometimes even exhibits the most explanatory power
during the 1980s (for French chemicals and stone, clay and glass in Italy), we may
sustain the hypothesis that competition from the Asian NICs has risen in importance
over the years.
Combining the sectors we worked with above with the 22 non-overlapping sectors
we found in the perfect competition case, we have a group of 29 sectors (exclu-
ding overlap) for which either a perfect or an imperfect competition approach seems
acceptable. With a total of 67 sectors, the aggregation problem thus seems to have
serious effects on the performance of our model. Nevertheless, the evidence that can
be obtained from the imperfect competition model is that the main conclusions of
the perfect competition model are endorsed. Specific factors are important and the
role of both technology and trade in explaining wage and/or labour growth changes
(with trade being influential in both periods) has clearly come forward.
5. Policy Conclusions
Under perfect competition and the small country assumption protectionism is
damaging. It is here that the whole discussion has its policy relevance. Firms and
sectoral institutions ask governments for protectionism or for compensation for
losses from trade. One such policy action has been the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program in the US. Sachs and Shatz (1994) show that the sectoral distribution of
compensations from that program are strongly correlated with the underlying
sectoral distribution of sectoral employment losses. In our analysis of the perfect
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competition case we found that 7 (7) of the sectors that have a negative effect from
adverse terms of trade movements have decreasing wages. Although admittedly the
evidence is not overwhelming, one could ask the crucial question whether income
policies for the short run and R&D subsidies for the long run would be a better
means to help sectors like these than protectionism. As international trade has
gained in importance since the 1980s this question has become more urgent for
some sectors.
However, it should be clear that behind the given interest rate there is a critical
issue of interest rate determination and behind the given sectoral labour supply and
wages there are labour market imperfections. Given the dominance of the labour
supply variable in both the perfect and the imperfect competition version of our
model, it seems reasonable to search for a diagnosis and a solution to problems in
the labour market sphere. There, specific factors have turned out to be a robust
variable that is more important than both technology and trade.
6. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
The major drawback of a trade-theoretic approach is that international trade
models are not related to models explaining unemployment and vice versa. The
state of the art in the literature thus seems to be somewhat unsatisfactory. This is
the reason why economists currently have to choose between a closed economy
labour market imperfections approach and a first-best trade approach. The integra-
tion of the two must be left for further research. Moreover, due to the simplifying
assumption of constant price elasticities of demand and therefore of mark-ups over
marginal costs, we cannot include their change across the business cycle without
considerably complicating the model.
An incentive for further research from our analysis follows from three results.
First, in the perfect competition case the constant term in our model was absent but
the empirics tell us that we should have one (thus indicating that there are possibly
other explanatory variables that should have been included in the model). Second,
the model would predict relations between the coefficients, but the corresponding
constraint has been rejected by statistical tests. Third, we could not exclude
increasing returns to scale in case of perfect competition, while we only found some
preliminary evidence hereof in the imperfect competition case. Nevertheless, as can
be concluded from the rejection of the imposed constraint in the perfect competition
model and the unsatisfactory results reached for most sectors with imperfect
competition, we are still faced with an aggregation problem. Thus, we cannot
actually prove that the assumption of perfect competition is wrong. So, even if our
model and estimation results are rather crude to give a ’robust’ answer to the
question what factor drives sectoral wage growth most strongly (technology or
trade), our results do have some relevance. In particular, the supply of specific
factors turned out to matter in both models (with the results being very robust in
that respect) and the changing role of international trade (becoming more important
than technology in the 1980s according to the perfect competition model) has been
clearly illustrated.
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APPENDIX A1
Data Description
All data except the Spanish, data on long-term interest rates and data on technical
change are taken from the OECD’s ISDB database. Employment data contain the
number of employees, excluding the self-employed. Wages include all payments
made to wage and salary earners1, including social security payments. Both sectoral
and national prices are also calculated from the ISDB database, via value added at
market prices (with 1985 as a base year). Technically speaking, it would have been
preferable to use value added at factor costs to construct price levels for this would
exclude taxes and subsidies which may differ between countries. Only for Great-
Britain value added was available at factor costs in the database (and subsequently
used). All variables are expressed in national price levels.
All interest data are taken from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook
published by the IMF (from 1990 and 1995 publications). The long-term govern-
ment bond yield was taken as a proxy for the long-term interest rate2.
As a proxy of technical change, R&D expenditures are used3. These data are
taken from the OECD’s ANBERD database.
For Spain, employment, wage and sectoral price levels are calculated from the
OECD’s STAN database. Spanish employment figures do include the self-
employed. R&D data are again taken from ANBERD, whereas both national price
levels (the GDP deflator) and the interest rate data are taken from the International
Financial Statistics Yearbook. All import data (for all countries) come from the
OECD’s BITRA database.
The sectors included in the analysis are the 2-digit ISIC sectors 31 through 39,
which define total manufacturing (ISIC sector 30). In the remainder, we will denote
these sectors by means of an abbreviation. These abbreviations are:
1 . Which also do not include the self-employed.
2 . As suggested by the IMF itself, cf. the International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1995 (1995),
pp. xv-xvi.
3 . One may claim that because R&D personnel is included in the labour variable our regression
results are biased (since we are also using R&D expenditures as a separate variable). However, this
only means that there may be some collinearity between the R&D and labour variable (which is
justified from a theoretical point of view). Regression results do not become biased because of
collinearity. See also section 3 of the main text.
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Table A.1.1 Sector classification and abbreviations.
ISIC code Abbreviation Sector description
30 ZMT Total manufacturing
31 ZLF Food, drink and tobacco
32 ZLX Textiles, footwear and leather
33 ZOW Wood, cork and furniture
34 ZOP Paper and printing
35 Z35 Chemicals
36 ZOG Stone, clay and glass
37 ZMB Basic metals
38 Z38 Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
39 ZOO Other manufacturing industries
Furthermore, the following country codes will be used from here onwards:
Table A.1.2 Country codes.
Country Country code
USA USA
Former West-Germany DEU
France FRA
Great-Britain GBR
Netherlands NLD
Italy ITA
Spain ESP
In the regression analyses three sectors were dropped because of missing R&D
data: the Dutch and Italian wood, cork and furniture sector and the Dutch other
manufacturing industries.
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APPENDIX A2
Growth Rates
Below, an overview of mean growth rates of the variables included in our model
can be found. The period over which means are taken is motivated by the
estimation periods of the ’final’ regressions depicted in appendix B3. The table is
divided into two parts: first, the results for the US, Germany, France and Great-
Britain are shown, whereafter the results for the Netherlands, Spain and Italy
follow.
Table A.2.1 Mean growth rates for the US, Germany, France and Great-Britain
(sample period according to appendix B3, variable definitions
according to the regression equation and appendix B1).
Sector L W P A
USAZ35 0.0063 0.0179 -0.0019 0.0455
USAZ38 -0.0036 0.0062 -0.0156 0.0126
USAZLX -0.0199 -0.0145 -0.0265 0.032
USAZOG -0.0134 -0.008 -0.0076 0.0105
USAZOP 0.0108 0.0179 0.0052 0.0522
USAZLF -0.002 0.0048 0.0023 0.0294
USAZMB -0.0286 -0.0222 0.0015 -0.0049
USAZMT -0.0045 0.0047 -0.0085 0.0187
USAZOO -0.0067 0.0018 -0.0048 0.0041
USAZOW 0 0.0046 -0.0056 0.0209
DEUZMT -0.008 0.0138 -0.0026 0.042
DEUZ35 0.0034 0.0248 0.0026 0.0308
DEUZ38 0.0018 0.026 -0.0012 0.0519
DEUZLF -0.0034 0.0099 -0.0038 0.0651
DEUZLX -0.0435 -0.0222 -0.008 0.0583
DEUZMB -0.0157 -0.0003 -0.0135 0.0026
DEUZOG -0.0178 0.0009 -0.0064 0.0684
DEUZOP -0.0031 0.0153 0.0025 0.0789
DEUZOW -0.006 0.0091 0.0086 0.4281
FRAZLF 0.0037 0.017 -0.0049 0.073
FRAZLX -0.0393 -0.0195 -0.0019 -0.0056
FRAZMB -0.0257 -0.0219 -0.0196 0.0791
FRAZOG -0.0244 -0.0037 0.001 0.0215
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Sector L W P A
FRAZOO -0.0053 0.0034 0.0008 0.0752
FRAZOP -0.0016 0.018 0.0087 0.0227
GBRZ38 -0.0244 -0.0067 -0.0073 -0.1341
GBRZLF -0.0212 0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0886
GBRZMT -0.0283 -0.0047 -0.0061 0.0127
GBRZOG -0.0333 -0.009 0.0032 -0.0369
GBRZOO -0.0253 0.0209 0.0359 -0.0019
GBRZOW -0.0152 -0.0077 -0.0007 -0.0019
GBRZOP -0.0101 0.0107 0.006 -0.0022
GBRZMB -0.0571 -0.0457 -0.0206 -0.0914
FRAZ35 -0.006 0.003 -0.0079 0.0458
FRAZ38 -0.0149 0.0004 -0.0035 0.0507
FRAZOW -0.0235 -0.0082 -0.0051 0.0779
DEUZOO -0.0216 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0243
FRAZMT -0.0095 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.044
GBRZ35 -0.007 0.0264 -0.021 0.0692
GBRZLX -0.0376 -0.0053 0 -0.0537
DEURATE1 0.0696 SMPL: 74-93
USARATE 0.3643 74-93
DEURATE2 0.0734 74-92
GBRRATE1 0.259 74-92
FRARATE1 0.5437 74-91
GBRRATE2 0.0303 74-89
FRARATE2 -0.2758 80-91
DEURATE3 0.0447 81-92
GBRRATE3 0.4908 86-92
FRARATE3 0.1147 86-91
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Table A.2.2 Mean growth rates for the Netherlands, Spain and Italy (sample
period according to appendix B3, variable definitions according to
the regression equation and appendix B1).
Sector L W P A
NLDZMT -0.0123 0.0028 -0.0095 0.0187
NLDZOP -0.0006 0.0134 -0.0064 0.0126
NLDZLF -0.0115 0.0042 -0.0099 0.0415
NLDZLX -0.0495 -0.0353 -0.0054 -0.0074
NLDZMB -0.0139 -0.0015 -0.0083 0.0234
NLDZ35 0.0026 0.0137 -0.0052 0.0223
NLDZ38 -0.0098 -0.0007 0.0007 0.019
NLDZOG -0.0135 0.0036 0.0084 0.0585
ESPZ35 -0.0184 -0.0056 -0.0019 0.0824
ESPZ38 -0.0001 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.1399
ESPZLF -0.0085 0.0092 -0.0188 0.111
ESPZLX -0.0333 -0.0361 -0.0088 0.1199
ESPZMB -0.0399 -0.0323 -0.0339 0.0173
ESPZMT -0.0138 -0.0078 -0.0089 0.1139
ESPZOG -0.0221 -0.0159 0.0005 0.047
ESPZOO -0.0129 0.0017 -0.0489 0.5407
ESPZOP 0.0099 0.023 0.0089 0.1171
ESPZOW -0.0189 -0.0173 -0.0047 0.5935
ITAZ35 -0.0051 0.0038 -0.0466 0.0545
ITAZLF -0.0121 0.0002 -0.0191 0.0967
ITAZMB -0.0369 -0.0257 -0.0519 0.0418
ITAZMT -0.0153 -0.0036 -0.0256 0.0752
ITAZOG -0.0086 0.0059 -0.0037 0.1213
ITAZOP -0.0094 0.0034 -0.0158 0.0204
ITAZOO -0.0161 0.0002 0.0044 0.2288
ITAZOW -0.0211 -0.0102 -0.0148 -0.0148
ITAZ38 -0.025 -0.01 -0.0245 0.056
ITAZLX -0.0197 -0.0107 -0.0176 0.3001
NLDRATE1 -0.292 SMPL: 74-93
ITARATE1 0.5662 74-94
ESPRATE -9.5446 80-91
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Sector
ITARATE2 0.1873 SMPL: 81-94
NLDRATE2 0.0287 81-93
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APPENDIX B1
Basic regressions/Testing for structural breaks
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector subscript;
wijt γ0ij γ1ijpijt γ2ijrjt γ3ijAijt γ4ijLijt εijt,
j = country subscript;
w,p,r,A,L are defined cf. the basic perfect competition model;
ε = random disturbance term.
Sector and country classifications are defined in table A.1.1 and A.1.2 (SECTOR). The estimation period is given under SMPL. T indicates the
value of the T-statistic for the null hypothesis that γk = 0 (k = 0..4). Chow tests are carried out in (roughly) 1981 and 1985 (exact dates are given
in the main text, pp. 8-9). pm denotes the p-value of the corresponding F-statistic Fm (m = 81,85). denotes the value of the adjusted R² statistic,R2
whereas DW contains the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic for (first-order) serial correlation in the disturbance term εijt. All regression equations
are estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. If an entry cannot be calculated, it is denoted by ***.
SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DW F81 p81 F85 p85R2
DEUZ35 74-92 0.02 (3.76) 0.13 (1.82) 0.03 (2.37) 0.12 (0.70) 0.74 (3.40) 0.57 1.74 1.1 0.42 0.4 0.84
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.38) 0.02 (0.35) 0.01 (0.83) 0.19 (0.55) 1.02 (8.01) 0.66 1.29 3.0 0.07 0.3 0.88
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (4.80) 0.02 (1.03) 0.00 (0.36) -0.08 (1.55) 1.25 (12.66) 0.84 1.96 0.8 0.57 0.8 0.57
DEUZLX 74-92 0.02 (3.05) -0.00 (0.41) 0.01 (0.79) -0.15 (0.90) 1.01 (7.59) 0.82 1.25 0.9 0.51 0.1 1.00
DEUZMB 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.04 (0.63) 0.03 (2.18) 0.38 (3.61) 1.06 (3.99) 0.63 2.25 0.5 0.79 0.6 0.71
DEUZMT 74-93 0.02 (4.55) 0.08 (1.94) 0.01 (1.06) -0.22 (1.04) 1.07 (12.12) 0.78 1.40 2.8 0.08 0.2 0.94
DEUZOG 74-92 0.02 (3.41) 0.02 (0.71) 0.02 (1.01) 0.04 (0.20) 1.24 (8.17) 0.77 1.81 1.6 0.24 0.8 0.58
DEUZOO 74-92 0.03 (2.74) -0.00 (1.70) -0.01 (0.28) -0.22 (2.08) 0.98 (5.73) 0.65 1.83 5.6 0.01 0.4 0.85
DEUZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.34) 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.76) 0.14 (0.88) 0.81 (4.04) 0.60 1.52 1.1 0.41 0.3 0.91
DEUZOW 74-92 0.02 (2.83) 0.00 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) -0.14 (0.49) 1.29 (11.80) 0.73 2.44 0.7 0.66 0.4 0.83
FRAZ35 74-91 0.03 (1.73) -0.08 (0.33) -0.00 (0.53) -0.09 (0.66) 1.59 (1.64) 0.14 1.14 16.7 0.00 2.8 0.10
FRAZ38 74-91 0.02 (1.20) 0.19 (0.74) 0.00 (0.52) 0.13 (0.23) 1.43 (3.42) 0.49 1.09 12.4 0.00 2.4 0.13
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (1.19) 0.04 (0.37) 0.00 (1.13) -0.27 (0.50) 0.43 (0.47) -0.20 1.11 3.4 0.06 0.6 0.73
FRAZLX 74-91 0.02 (1.32) 0.01 (0.18) 0.00 (0.87) -0.22 (1.39) 1.16 (2.67) 0.29 1.50 1.6 0.28 0.3 0.90
FRAZMB 74-91 0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.38) 0.00 (0.93) 0.13 (0.71) 0.93 (0.94) 0.21 2.64 0.1 0.99 0.5 0.77
FRAZMT 74-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.20 (1.18) 0.00 (1.83) -0.54 (2.92) 1.30 (3.42) 0.62 1.05 9.9 0.00 5.7 0.02
FRAZOG 74-91 0.02 (1.40) 0.03 (0.32) -0.01 (3.43) 0.36 (1.81) 0.72 (3.14) 0.33 2.11 3.4 0.06 0.7 0.64
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.54) 0.00 (1.55) 0.04 (0.33) 0.19 (0.42) -0.19 1.76 1.3 0.36 1.9 0.19
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (8.09) -0.21 (4.10) -0.00 (6.29) 0.18 (2.29) 0.17 (0.90) 0.81 2.29 2.1 0.17 0.6 0.67
FRAZOW 74-91 0.02 (2.15) -0.03 (0.82) 0.00 (0.56) 0.44 (2.80) 0.71 (6.05) 0.33 1.83 4.2 0.04 0.3 0.92
GBRZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.00) 0.16 (0.82) -0.00 (0.23) 0.22 (1.10) 0.47 (2.29) 0.20 2.42 1.6 0.25 3.6 0.05
GBRZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.37) -0.00 (0.33) 0.17 (0.78) 0.33 (1.25) -0.00 1.64 3.1 0.07 1.7 0.24
GBRZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.34) 0.07 (0.35) -0.00 (0.17) 0.06 (0.58) -0.15 (0.42) -0.21 2.35 1.9 0.20 2.2 0.14
GBRZLX 74-92 0.04 (1.71) 0.30 (1.08) 0.00 (0.29) 0.33 (1.15) 0.67 (2.86) 0.50 2.20 11.1 0.00 4.2 0.03
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.63) 0.42 (1.01) 0.00 (0.83) 0.12 (0.74) 0.44 (1.57) -0.09 1.35 1.9 0.23 *** ***
GBRZMT 74-92 0.02 (1.18) 0.04 (0.24) -0.00 (0.06) 0.29 (1.21) 0.67 (3.39) 0.28 2.01 2.9 0.08 2.8 0.08
GBRZOG 74-92 0.01 (1.29) 0.35 (2.85) 0.00 (0.19) 0.25 (2.22) 0.31 (1.01) 0.52 1.12 1.1 0.44 2.0 0.17
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SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DW F81 p81 F85 p85R2
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.10 (1.19) -0.01 (1.41) 0.71 (4.72) -0.07 (0.56) 0.59 1.68 1.5 0.29 1.8 0.22
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (2.02) 0.10 (1.73) -0.01 (2.04) 0.43 (2.18) 0.77 (3.22) 0.28 1.83 0.9 0.52 0.7 0.63
GBRZOW 74-92 0.00 (0.47) 0.06 (0.81) 0.00 (0.35) 0.19 (1.41) 0.76 (5.72) 0.53 2.27 1.4 0.32 0.7 0.66
USAZ35 74-93 0.01 (1.85) 0.08 (0.94) -0.00 (2.12) 0.06 (1.01) 0.82 (6.34) 0.75 2.18 *** *** 0.4 0.85
USAZ38 74-93 0.01 (1.73) 0.08 (1.20) -0.00 (1.19) 0.01 (0.04) 0.88 (9.02) 0.89 1.50 *** *** 0.8 0.59
USAZLF 74-93 0.01 (2.56) 0.02 (0.62) -0.00 (1.96) -0.11 (1.65) 0.77 (4.42) 0.60 2.16 *** *** 0.5 0.76
USAZLX 74-93 0.01 (1.86) 0.04 (1.26) -0.00 (1.01) 0.17 (1.17) 1.11 (31.89) 0.95 1.73 *** *** 1.2 0.37
USAZMB 74-93 0.01 (2.01) 0.04 (0.85) -0.00 (1.97) 0.06 (1.79) 1.05 (16.36) 0.92 1.69 *** *** 1.6 0.25
USAZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.55) 0.04 (0.75) -0.00 (1.37) -0.03 (0.15) 0.94 (12.60) 0.90 2.04 *** *** 0.3 0.88
USAZOG 74-93 0.01 (1.06) 0.04 (1.23) -0.00 (0.65) -0.01 (0.07) 1.00 (9.28) 0.88 2.52 *** *** 0.1 1.00
USAZOO 74-93 0.01 (2.38) 0.06 (1.39) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.49) 0.94 (7.38) 0.84 2.00 *** *** 0.3 0.91
USAZOP 74-93 0.01 (1.92) -0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.65) -0.01 (0.04) 1.01 (6.70) 0.69 2.08 *** *** 0.2 0.94
USAZOW 74-93 0.01 (2.11) 0.02 (1.00) -0.00 (1.99) 0.13 (2.05) 0.99 (24.18) 0.98 2.08 *** *** 0.4 0.87
ESPZ35 80-91 0.02 (3.21) -0.03 (3.10) 0.00 (2.67) 0.16 (3.59) 0.96 (9.00) 0.90 1.31 *** *** 7.3 0.12
ESPZ38 80-91 -0.01 (0.59) 0.02 (0.31) 0.00 (0.03) 0.06 (0.25) 1.10 (4.34) 0.64 1.59 *** *** 10.9 0.09
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.13) 0.06 (0.66) -0.00 (3.95) 0.25 (0.71) 0.37 (0.96) -0.02 1.55 *** *** 1.1 0.54
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.00 (0.19) -0.05 (1.81) -0.00 (0.73) -0.02 (0.11) 0.89 (6.06) 0.72 1.90 *** *** 2.5 0.31
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.88) 0.01 (0.40) -0.00 (1.11) 0.13 (1.18) 1.04 (4.50) 0.75 2.22 *** *** 3.0 0.27
ESPZMT 80-91 0.01 (0.72) 0.02 (0.57) 0.00 (0.22) 0.39 (2.35) 0.90 (6.69) 0.78 1.16 *** *** 4.4 0.20
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.00 (0.13) 0.05 (1.11) 0.00 (0.02) 0.32 (4.23) 0.79 (9.96) 0.88 2.15 *** *** 2.7 0.29
ESPZOO 80-91 0.02 (0.60) 0.01 (1.18) 0.00 (0.52) 0.13 (0.69) 0.80 (6.32) 0.62 0.91 *** *** 0.7 0.68
ESPZOP 80-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.01 (0.38) -0.00 (1.68) -0.05 (0.41) 0.69 (7.48) 0.85 1.55 *** *** 1.0 0.57
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.67) 0.01 (0.77) -0.00 (0.59) 0.32 (1.48) 0.78 (3.48) 0.73 1.50 *** *** 15.1 0.06
ITAZ35 74-94 0.02 (2.69) 0.06 (0.93) 0.00 (0.26) 0.11 (0.95) 1.07 (6.56) 0.59 1.83 0.7 0.67 0.7 0.63
ITAZ38 74-94 0.02 (3.49) 0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (2.19) 0.39 (3.66) 1.05 (6.24) 0.78 2.25 4.4 0.02 0.9 0.49
ITAZLF 74-94 0.03 (4.66) -0.03 (1.20) 0.00 (1.44) 0.45 (2.77) 1.10 (6.82) 0.57 2.34 1.0 0.47 1.6 0.24
ITAZLX 74-94 0.01 (1.29) -0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (1.09) 0.30 (1.56) 0.76 (2.77) 0.34 2.04 9.2 0.00 0.2 0.97
ITAZMB 74-94 0.01 (1.00) -0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.37) 0.05 (1.07) 0.93 (2.69) 0.59 2.92 2.0 0.15 0.2 0.94
ITAZMT 74-94 0.02 (3.32) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (1.07) 0.44 (2.87) 1.00 (5.68) 0.66 1.87 1.4 0.31 0.5 0.74
ITAZOG 74-94 0.02 (2.25) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (1.65) -0.02 (0.32) 0.91 (5.46) 0.66 1.68 2.4 0.10 1.3 0.33
ITAZOO 74-94 0.02 (2.72) -0.01 (0.69) 0.01 (4.31) 0.06 (2.54) 0.96 (6.65) 0.75 2.22 1.7 0.21 0.6 0.71
ITAZOP 74-94 0.01 (2.49) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (3.44) -0.07 (1.16) 0.81 (7.64) 0.53 1.82 0.3 0.88 0.3 0.88
NLDZ35 81-93 0.01 (2.62) -0.07 (1.21) 0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (1.60) 1.15 (3.58) 0.53 1.82 *** *** *** ***
NLDZ38 81-93 0.01 (1.57) -0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.53) 0.67 (4.24) 0.85 (7.48) 0.86 1.51 *** *** *** ***
NLDZLF 74-93 0.01 (1.69) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (2.84) -0.10 (1.24) 0.71 (2.91) 0.05 1.60 0.3 0.89 1.3 0.34
NLDZLX 74-93 -0.00 (0.22) -0.02 (0.54) -0.00 (1.19) 0.28 (1.62) 0.66 (5.65) 0.73 1.78 1.8 0.20 1.1 0.42
NLDZMB 74-93 0.01 (0.95) 0.14 (2.25) 0.00 (3.93) 0.09 (1.71) 0.66 (1.91) 0.54 1.38 2.5 0.10 0.3 0.89
NLDZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.22) 0.10 (1.49) -0.00 (1.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.89 (5.45) 0.56 1.26 1.7 0.22 0.3 0.89
NLDZOG 81-93 0.01 (2.32) -0.02 (1.29) -0.01 (0.75) 0.60 (8.57) 0.60 (7.23) 0.96 1.40 *** *** *** ***
NLDZOP 74-93 0.02 (4.29) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) 0.10 (0.69) 1.03 (5.86) 0.72 2.00 2.0 0.17 2.7 0.08
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APPENDIX B2
Testing the significance of the constant term
Regression equation identical to appendix B1. When found to be significant, structural breaks are taken into account. All equations are
estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. All other definitions according to appendix B1.
SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DWR2
DEUZ35 74-92 0.02 (3.76) 0.13 (1.82) 0.03 (2.37) 0.12 (0.70) 0.74 (3.40) 0.57 1.74
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.38) 0.02 (0.35) 0.01 (0.83) 0.19 (0.55) 1.02 (8.01) 0.66 1.29
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (4.80) 0.02 (1.03) 0.00 (0.36) -0.08 (1.55) 1.25 (12.66) 0.84 1.96
DEUZLX 74-92 0.02 (3.05) -0.00 (0.41) 0.01 (0.79) -0.15 (0.90) 1.01 (7.59) 0.82 1.25
DEUZMB 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.04 (0.63) 0.03 (2.18) 0.38 (3.61) 1.06 (3.99) 0.63 2.25
DEUZMT 74-93 0.02 (4.55) 0.08 (1.94) 0.01 (1.06) -0.22 (1.04) 1.07 (12.12) 0.78 1.40
DEUZOG 74-92 0.02 (3.41) 0.02 (0.71) 0.02 (1.01) 0.04 (0.20) 1.24 (8.17) 0.77 1.81
DEUZOO 81-92 0.02 (5.40) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (1.04) -0.51 (2.77) 0.71 (5.49) 0.87 2.61
DEUZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.34) 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.76) 0.14 (0.88) 0.81 (4.04) 0.60 1.52
DEUZOW 74-92 0.02 (2.83) 0.00 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) -0.14 (0.49) 1.29 (11.80) 0.73 2.44
FRAZ35 80-91 -0.00 (0.33) 0.16 (0.96) -0.01 (3.83) 0.03 (0.28) 0.58 (2.85) 0.35 2.74
FRAZ38 80-91 -0.01 (1.80) 0.42 (3.41) -0.00 (1.05) -0.56 (3.15) 0.73 (3.96) 0.82 2.63
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (1.19) 0.04 (0.37) 0.00 (1.13) -0.27 (0.50) 0.43 (0.47) -0.20 1.11
FRAZLX 74-91 0.02 (1.32) 0.01 (0.18) 0.00 (0.87) -0.22 (1.39) 1.16 (2.67) 0.29 1.50
FRAZMB 74-91 0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.38) 0.00 (0.93) 0.13 (0.71) 0.93 (0.94) 0.21 2.64
FRAZMT 86-91 0.03 (2.10) -0.36 (1.42) 0.01 (1.05) -0.81 (7.27) 1.46 (3.01) 0.92 3.27
FRAZOG 74-91 0.02 (1.40) 0.03 (0.32) -0.01 (3.43) 0.36 (1.81) 0.72 (3.14) 0.33 2.11
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.54) 0.00 (1.55) 0.04 (0.33) 0.19 (0.42) -0.19 1.76
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (8.09) -0.21 (4.10) -0.00 (6.29) 0.18 (2.29) 0.17 (0.90) 0.81 2.29
FRAZOW 80-91 0.01 (1.57) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (1.90) 0.17 (1.22) 0.81 (12.31) 0.75 2.58
GBRZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.00) 0.16 (0.82) -0.00 (0.23) 0.22 (1.10) 0.47 (2.29) 0.20 2.42
GBRZ35 86-92 0.03 (1.10) 0.20 (0.91) -0.02 (4.24) 0.45 (2.53) -0.37 (0.40) 0.44 3.05
GBRZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.37) -0.00 (0.33) 0.17 (0.78) 0.33 (1.25) -0.00 1.64
GBRZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.34) 0.07 (0.35) -0.00 (0.17) 0.06 (0.58) -0.15 (0.42) -0.21 2.35
GBRZLX 86-92 0.00 (0.06) -0.16 (0.26) -0.02 (79.52) 1.84 (3.95) 0.17 (4.34) 0.98 0.72
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.63) 0.42 (1.01) 0.00 (0.83) 0.12 (0.74) 0.44 (1.57) -0.09 1.35
GBRZMT 74-92 0.02 (1.18) 0.04 (0.24) -0.00 (0.06) 0.29 (1.21) 0.67 (3.39) 0.28 2.01
GBRZOG 74-92 0.01 (1.29) 0.35 (2.85) 0.00 (0.19) 0.25 (2.22) 0.31 (1.01) 0.52 1.12
GBRZOO 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.10 (1.19) -0.01 (1.41) 0.71 (4.72) -0.07 (0.56) 0.59 1.68
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (2.02) 0.10 (1.73) -0.01 (2.04) 0.43 (2.18) 0.77 (3.22) 0.28 1.83
GBRZOW 74-92 0.00 (0.47) 0.06 (0.81) 0.00 (0.35) 0.19 (1.41) 0.76 (5.72) 0.53 2.27
USAZ35 74-93 0.01 (1.85) 0.08 (0.94) -0.00 (2.12) 0.06 (1.01) 0.82 (6.34) 0.75 2.18
USAZ38 74-93 0.01 (1.73) 0.08 (1.20) -0.00 (1.19) 0.01 (0.04) 0.88 (9.02) 0.89 1.50
USAZLF 74-93 0.01 (2.56) 0.02 (0.62) -0.00 (1.96) -0.11 (1.65) 0.77 (4.42) 0.60 2.16
USAZLX 74-93 0.01 (1.86) 0.04 (1.26) -0.00 (1.01) 0.17 (1.17) 1.11 (31.89) 0.95 1.73
USAZMB 74-93 0.01 (2.01) 0.04 (0.85) -0.00 (1.97) 0.06 (1.79) 1.05 (16.36) 0.92 1.69
USAZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.55) 0.04 (0.75) -0.00 (1.37) -0.03 (0.15) 0.94 (12.60) 0.90 2.04
USAZOG 74-93 0.01 (1.06) 0.04 (1.23) -0.00 (0.65) -0.01 (0.07) 1.00 (9.28) 0.88 2.52
USAZOO 74-93 0.01 (2.38) 0.06 (1.39) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.49) 0.94 (7.38) 0.84 2.00
USAZOP 74-93 0.01 (1.92) -0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.65) -0.01 (0.04) 1.01 (6.70) 0.69 2.08
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SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DWR2
USAZOW 74-93 0.01 (2.11) 0.02 (1.00) -0.00 (1.99) 0.13 (2.05) 0.99 (24.18) 0.98 2.08
ESPZ35 80-91 0.02 (3.21) -0.03 (3.10) 0.00 (2.67) 0.16 (3.59) 0.96 (9.00) 0.90 1.31
ESPZ38 80-91 -0.01 (0.59) 0.02 (0.31) 0.00 (0.03) 0.06 (0.25) 1.10 (4.34) 0.64 1.59
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.13) 0.06 (0.66) -0.00 (3.95) 0.25 (0.71) 0.37 (0.96) -0.02 1.55
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.00 (0.19) -0.05 (1.81) -0.00 (0.73) -0.02 (0.11) 0.89 (6.06) 0.72 1.90
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.88) 0.01 (0.40) -0.00 (1.11) 0.13 (1.18) 1.04 (4.50) 0.75 2.22
ESPZMT 80-91 0.01 (0.72) 0.02 (0.57) 0.00 (0.22) 0.39 (2.35) 0.90 (6.69) 0.78 1.16
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.00 (0.13) 0.05 (1.11) 0.00 (0.02) 0.32 (4.23) 0.79 (9.96) 0.88 2.15
ESPZOO 80-91 0.02 (0.60) 0.01 (1.18) 0.00 (0.52) 0.13 (0.69) 0.80 (6.32) 0.62 0.91
ESPZOP 80-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.01 (0.38) -0.00 (1.68) -0.05 (0.41) 0.69 (7.48) 0.85 1.55
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.67) 0.01 (0.77) -0.00 (0.59) 0.32 (1.48) 0.78 (3.48) 0.73 1.50
ITAZ35 74-94 0.02 (2.69) 0.06 (0.93) 0.00 (0.26) 0.11 (0.95) 1.07 (6.56) 0.59 1.83
ITAZ38 81-94 0.02 (2.33) 0.08 (1.64) 0.00 (0.28) 0.29 (1.34) 1.00 (7.14) 0.77 2.32
ITAZLF 74-94 0.03 (4.66) -0.03 (1.20) 0.00 (1.44) 0.45 (2.77) 1.10 (6.82) 0.57 2.34
ITAZLX 81-94 0.01 (0.84) -0.00 (0.20) -0.00 (0.80) 0.17 (0.72) 0.72 (4.15) 0.34 1.70
ITAZMB 74-94 0.01 (1.00) -0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.37) 0.05 (1.07) 0.93 (2.69) 0.59 2.92
ITAZMT 74-94 0.02 (3.32) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (1.07) 0.44 (2.87) 1.00 (5.68) 0.66 1.87
ITAZOG 74-94 0.02 (2.25) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (1.65) -0.02 (0.32) 0.91 (5.46) 0.66 1.68
ITAZOO 74-94 0.02 (2.72) -0.01 (0.69) 0.01 (4.31) 0.06 (2.54) 0.96 (6.65) 0.75 2.22
ITAZOP 74-94 0.01 (2.49) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (3.44) -0.07 (1.16) 0.81 (7.64) 0.53 1.82
NLDZ35 81-93 0.01 (2.62) -0.07 (1.21) 0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (1.60) 1.15 (3.58) 0.53 1.82
NLDZ38 81-93 0.01 (1.57) -0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.53) 0.67 (4.24) 0.85 (7.48) 0.86 1.51
NLDZLF 74-93 0.01 (1.69) 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (2.84) -0.10 (1.24) 0.71 (2.91) 0.05 1.60
NLDZLX 74-93 -0.00 (0.22) -0.02 (0.54) -0.00 (1.19) 0.28 (1.62) 0.66 (5.65) 0.73 1.78
NLDZMB 74-93 0.01 (0.95) 0.14 (2.25) 0.00 (3.93) 0.09 (1.71) 0.66 (1.91) 0.54 1.38
NLDZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.22) 0.10 (1.49) -0.00 (1.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.89 (5.45) 0.56 1.26
NLDZOG 81-93 0.01 (2.32) -0.02 (1.29) -0.01 (0.75) 0.60 (8.57) 0.60 (7.23) 0.96 1.40
NLDZOP 74-93 0.02 (4.29) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) 0.10 (0.69) 1.03 (5.86) 0.72 2.00
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APPENDIX B3
Including constant term
Regression equation identical to appendix B1. Whenever present, structural breaks and significant constant terms are taken into account. All
equations are estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. Frest is the value of the Wald-statistic when imposing the coefficient
restriction put forward in the main text. prest denotes the corresponding p-value. All other definitions according to appendix B1 and B2.
SECTOR SMPL γ0 Tγ0 γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DW Frest prestR2
DEUZ35 74-92 0.02 (3.76) 0.13 (1.82) 0.03 (2.37) 0.12 (0.70) 0.74 (3.40) 0.57 1.74 25.4 0.00
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.38) 0.02 (0.35) 0.01 (0.83) 0.19 (0.55) 1.02 (8.01) 0.66 1.29 4.7 0.03
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (4.80) 0.02 (1.03) 0.00 (0.36) -0.08 (1.55) 1.25 (12.66) 0.84 1.96 346.3 0.00
DEUZLX 74-92 0.02 (3.05) -0.00 (0.41) 0.01 (0.79) -0.15 (0.90) 1.01 (7.59) 0.82 1.25 43.8 0.00
DEUZMB 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.04 (0.63) 0.03 (2.18) 0.38 (3.61) 1.06 (3.99) 0.63 2.25 29.1 0.00
DEUZMT 74-93 0.02 (4.55) 0.08 (1.94) 0.01 (1.06) -0.22 (1.04) 1.07 (12.12) 0.78 1.40 31.3 0.00
DEUZOG 74-92 0.02 (3.41) 0.02 (0.71) 0.02 (1.01) 0.04 (0.20) 1.24 (8.17) 0.77 1.81 21.6 0.00
DEUZOO 81-92 0.02 (5.40) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (1.04) -0.51 (2.77) 0.71 (5.49) 0.87 2.61 71.9 0.00
DEUZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.34) 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.76) 0.14 (0.88) 0.81 (4.04) 0.60 1.52 26.4 0.00
DEUZOW 74-92 0.02 (2.83) 0.00 (0.14) 0.02 (0.90) -0.14 (0.49) 1.29 (11.80) 0.73 2.44 16.4 0.00
FRAZMT 86-91 0.03 (2.10) -0.36 (1.42) 0.01 (1.05) -0.81 (7.27) 1.46 (3.01) 0.92 3.27 254.1 0.00
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (8.09) -0.21 (4.10) -0.00 (6.29) 0.18 (2.29) 0.17 (0.90) 0.81 2.29 108.6 0.00
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (2.02) 0.10 (1.73) -0.01 (2.04) 0.43 (2.18) 0.77 (3.22) 0.28 1.83 8.8 0.00
USAZLF 74-93 0.01 (2.56) 0.02 (0.62) -0.00 (1.96) -0.11 (1.65) 0.77 (4.42) 0.60 2.16 264.7 0.00
USAZMB 74-93 0.01 (2.01) 0.04 (0.85) -0.00 (1.97) 0.06 (1.79) 1.05 (16.36) 0.92 1.69 707.2 0.00
USAZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.55) 0.04 (0.75) -0.00 (1.37) -0.03 (0.15) 0.94 (12.60) 0.90 2.04 29.9 0.00
USAZOO 74-93 0.01 (2.38) 0.06 (1.39) -0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.49) 0.94 (7.38) 0.84 2.00 110.9 0.00
USAZOW 74-93 0.01 (2.11) 0.02 (1.00) -0.00 (1.99) 0.13 (2.05) 0.99 (24.18) 0.98 2.08 185.7 0.00
ESPZ35 80-91 0.02 (3.21) -0.03 (3.10) 0.00 (2.67) 0.16 (3.59) 0.96 (9.00) 0.90 1.31 351.2 0.00
ESPZOP 80-91 0.01 (2.02) 0.01 (0.38) -0.00 (1.68) -0.05 (0.41) 0.69 (7.48) 0.85 1.55 79.9 0.00
ITAZ35 74-94 0.02 (2.69) 0.06 (0.93) 0.00 (0.26) 0.11 (0.95) 1.07 (6.56) 0.59 1.83 63.8 0.00
ITAZ38 81-94 0.02 (2.33) 0.08 (1.64) 0.00 (0.28) 0.29 (1.34) 1.00 (7.14) 0.77 2.32 321.0 0.00
ITAZLF 74-94 0.03 (4.66) -0.03 (1.20) 0.00 (1.44) 0.45 (2.77) 1.10 (6.82) 0.57 2.34 11.2 0.00
ITAZMT 74-94 0.02 (3.32) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (1.07) 0.44 (2.87) 1.00 (5.68) 0.66 1.87 13.3 0.00
ITAZOG 74-94 0.02 (2.25) 0.00 (0.38) 0.00 (1.65) -0.02 (0.32) 0.91 (5.46) 0.66 1.68 204.1 0.00
ITAZOP 74-94 0.01 (2.49) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (3.44) -0.07 (1.16) 0.81 (7.64) 0.53 1.82 351.4 0.00
NLDZ35 81-93 0.01 (2.62) -0.07 (1.21) 0.01 (0.71) 0.08 (1.60) 1.15 (3.58) 0.53 1.82 198.8 0.00
NLDZMT 74-93 0.01 (2.22) 0.10 (1.49) -0.00 (1.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.89 (5.45) 0.56 1.26 46.7 0.00
NLDZOG 81-93 0.01 (2.32) -0.02 (1.29) -0.01 (0.75) 0.60 (8.57) 0.60 (7.23) 0.96 1.40 36.2 0.00
NLDZOP 74-93 0.02 (4.29) -0.01 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) 0.10 (0.69) 1.03 (5.86) 0.72 2.00 35.7 0.00
45
Excluding constant term4
Regression equation identical to appendix B1, with γ0 = 0. Whenever present, structural breaks are taken into account. All equations are
estimated with a heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. All other definitions according to appendix B1 and B2.
SECTOR SMPL γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DW Frest prestR2
FRAZ35 80-91 0.13 (1.40) -0.01 (4.22) 0.02 (0.23) 0.60 (2.54) 0.42 2.74 89.9 0.00
FRAZ38 80-91 0.26 (6.44) -0.00 (0.60) -0.52 (2.38) 0.89 (7.11) 0.80 2.33 49.1 0.00
FRAZLF 74-91 0.08 (0.93) 0.00 (1.25) -0.36 (0.74) 0.79 (0.89) -0.17 1.22 7.7 0.01
FRAZLX 74-91 -0.03 (0.74) 0.00 (0.67) -0.22 (1.26) 0.57 (5.98) 0.23 1.49 48.3 0.00
FRAZMB 74-91 0.03 (0.90) 0.00 (1.20) 0.13 (0.75) 0.92 (3.36) 0.26 2.64 24.3 0.00
FRAZOG 74-91 0.13 (1.41) -0.01 (3.33) 0.50 (2.49) 0.38 (1.91) 0.31 1.80 6.5 0.01
FRAZOO 74-91 0.01 (0.81) 0.00 (1.61) 0.04 (0.35) 0.17 (0.47) -0.11 1.76 73.5 0.00
FRAZOW 80-91 0.01 (0.33) -0.00 (1.81) 0.13 (0.77) 0.66 (4.90) 0.68 1.61 26.7 0.00
GBRZ35 86-92 0.44 (4.36) -0.03 (4.99) 0.14 (0.31) -0.89 (1.70) 0.46 2.48 3.7 0.06
GBRZ38 74-92 -0.01 (0.65) -0.00 (0.32) 0.17 (0.81) 0.31 (1.85) 0.06 1.61 16.1 0.00
GBRZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.10) -0.00 (0.41) 0.06 (0.63) -0.24 (0.86) -0.14 2.33 100.8 0.00
GBRZLX 86-92 -0.20 (2.93) -0.02 (38.92) 1.87 (14.68) 0.17 (4.98) 0.99 0.72 44.3 0.00
GBRZMB 74-89 0.19 (1.15) 0.00 (0.61) 0.11 (0.71) 0.31 (1.51) -0.03 1.20 34.3 0.00
GBRZMT 74-92 0.17 (1.54) 0.00 (0.24) 0.24 (1.05) 0.39 (3.29) 0.23 1.48 11.4 0.00
GBRZOG 74-92 0.36 (3.16) 0.00 (0.02) 0.26 (2.41) 0.14 (0.48) 0.51 1.07 48.9 0.00
GBRZOO 74-92 0.09 (1.22) -0.01 (1.50) 0.70 (4.85) -0.06 (0.54) 0.61 1.66 4.5 0.03
GBRZOW 74-92 0.06 (0.86) 0.00 (0.35) 0.19 (1.44) 0.73 (6.44) 0.55 2.20 39.7 0.00
USAZ35 74-93 0.21 (3.59) -0.00 (1.38) 0.04 (0.60) 0.85 (6.03) 0.71 2.10 227.8 0.00
USAZ38 74-93 0.14 (2.23) -0.00 (0.86) -0.21 (1.34) 0.80 (10.63) 0.87 1.28 58.6 0.00
USAZLX 74-93 0.06 (2.35) -0.00 (3.17) -0.10 (1.49) 1.05 (22.96) 0.94 1.42 268.7 0.00
USAZOG 74-93 0.05 (1.80) -0.00 (0.30) -0.07 (0.54) 0.98 (9.70) 0.88 2.28 70.4 0.00
USAZOP 74-93 0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.21) 0.10 (0.71) 1.08 (8.58) 0.63 1.54 39.0 0.00
ESPZ38 80-91 -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.34) 0.07 (0.30) 1.12 (4.70) 0.68 1.65 16.9 0.00
ESPZLF 80-91 0.07 (0.81) -0.00 (4.29) 0.17 (0.53) 0.35 (0.96) 0.10 1.60 6.5 0.01
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.05 (2.03) -0.00 (0.71) -0.02 (0.15) 0.91 (6.05) 0.75 1.89 50.8 0.00
ESPZMB 80-91 0.03 (1.24) -0.00 (1.14) 0.07 (0.89) 0.89 (8.00) 0.74 1.98 139.4 0.00
ESPZMT 80-91 0.05 (1.15) -0.00 (0.41) 0.38 (2.31) 0.86 (5.82) 0.80 1.19 14.6 0.00
ESPZOG 80-91 0.05 (1.76) 0.00 (0.39) 0.32 (4.52) 0.79 (12.48) 0.90 2.16 93.0 0.00
ESPZOO 80-91 0.01 (1.67) 0.00 (0.31) 0.09 (0.55) 0.77 (5.67) 0.63 0.91 29.6 0.00
ESPZOW 80-91 0.00 (0.43) -0.00 (0.32) 0.29 (1.39) 0.83 (3.45) 0.76 1.43 11.1 0.00
ITAZLX 81-94 0.00 (0.55) -0.00 (0.59) 0.03 (0.25) 0.59 (3.22) 0.38 1.72 68.5 0.00
ITAZMB 74-94 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.47) 0.06 (1.41) 0.75 (3.45) 0.57 2.75 514.8 0.00
ITAZOO 74-94 0.00 (0.22) 0.01 (5.64) 0.08 (2.40) 0.75 (6.57) 0.66 1.78 686.3 0.00
NLDZ38 81-93 0.00 (0.13) 0.01 (0.80) 0.72 (3.16) 0.76 (8.50) 0.83 1.26 1.4 0.23
NLDZLF 74-93 0.01 (0.56) 0.00 (1.27) -0.10 (1.00) 0.26 (1.57) -0.11 1.46 123.4 0.00
NLDZLX 74-93 -0.02 (0.53) -0.00 (1.17) 0.28 (1.63) 0.68 (7.84) 0.74 1.78 18.3 0.00
4 . The Durbin-Watson statistic can in the absence of a constant term in the regression equation, only be regarded as a crude indication of the presence of (first-order)
serial correlation. Tests based on a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) approach gave identical results though.
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SECTOR SMPL γ3 Tγ3 γ2 Tγ2 γ1 Tγ1 γ4 Tγ4 DW Frest prestR2
NLDZMB 74-93 0.15 (2.42) 0.00 (3.41) 0.09 (1.76) 0.55 (1.83) 0.54 1.21 332.7 0.00
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APPENDIX B4
Granger causality tests
Regression equation is:
where i = sector subscript,
Yijt δ0ij pijαpijYij,t p qijβqijXij,t q εijt,
j = country subscript,
p,q = predetermined lag orders (p,q = 1..3),
ε = random disturbance term.
First it is tested whether labour growth Granger causes wage growth (FLW, with corresponding p-value pLW), whereafter the reverse situation
is tested (denoted by FWL, with corresponding p-value pWL).
SECTOR SMPL FLW pLW FWL pWL
USAZ35 74-94 1.67 0.22 1.12 0.38
DEUZ35 74-94 1.20 0.35 3.04 0.07
GBRZ35 74-94 0.49 0.70 5.89 0.01
NLDZ35 74-94 1.01 0.42 0.19 0.90
ESPZ35 74-94 0.84 0.56 0.34 0.80
ITAZ35 74-94 0.56 0.65 1.33 0.30
USAZ38 74-94 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.61
GBRZ38 74-94 6.33 0.01 2.98 0.07
NLDZ38 74-94 2.09 0.15 0.64 0.60
ESPZ38 74-94 0.27 0.85 0.63 0.64
ITAZ38 74-94 0.51 0.68 3.07 0.06
USAZLF 74-94 0.43 0.73 0.32 0.81
DEUZLF 74-94 1.26 0.33 0.16 0.92
GBRZLF 74-94 4.73 0.02 0.42 0.74
NLDZLF 74-94 1.32 0.31 0.66 0.59
ESPZLF 74-94 1.36 0.40 0.33 0.81
ITAZLF 74-94 0.59 0.63 1.06 0.40
USAZLX 74-94 1.70 0.22 0.57 0.64
FRAZLX 74-94 0.40 0.76 0.92 0.46
DEUZLX 74-94 2.02 0.16 0.99 0.43
GBRZLX 74-94 0.59 0.64 8.04 0.00
NLDZLX 74-94 1.08 0.39 0.04 0.99
ESPZLX 74-94 4.19 0.13 10.2 0.04
ITAZLX 74-94 0.40 0.75 0.80 0.51
USAZMB 74-94 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.60
FRAZMB 74-94 1.19 0.36 1.22 0.35
DEUZMB 74-94 0.67 0.59 0.26 0.85
GBRZMB 74-94 0.17 0.92 3.75 0.05
NLDZMB 74-94 0.94 0.45 2.48 0.11
ESPZMB 74-94 0.68 0.62 0.42 0.75
ITAZMB 74-94 1.15 0.36 2.66 0.09
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SECTOR SMPL FLW pLW FWL pWL
USAZMT 74-94 0.90 0.47 0.85 0.49
GBRZMT 74-94 4.29 0.03 7.87 0.00
NLDZMT 74-94 2.49 0.11 0.40 0.76
ITAZMT 74-94 0.76 0.54 3.21 0.06
USAZOG 74-94 0.54 0.67 1.05 0.41
DEUZOG 74-94 0.38 0.77 0.40 0.75
NLDZOG 74-94 0.67 0.59 0.21 0.89
ESPZOG 74-94 0.80 0.57 2.34 0.25
ITAZOG 74-94 0.32 0.81 0.50 0.69
USAZOO 74-94 0.46 0.72 1.26 0.33
FRAZOO 74-94 0.95 0.45 0.78 0.53
DEUZOO 74-94 0.64 0.60 2.38 0.12
GBRZOO 74-94 0.41 0.75 1.89 0.18
NLDZOO 74-94 0.99 0.43 1.50 0.26
ESPZOO 74-94 2.26 0.26 0.63 0.64
USAZOP 74-94 1.66 0.22 1.12 0.38
FRAZOP 74-94 2.85 0.09 3.37 0.06
DEUZOP 74-94 0.51 0.68 0.29 0.83
GBRZOP 74-94 1.96 0.17 3.07 0.07
NLDZOP 74-94 3.09 0.06 0.62 0.61
ESPZOP 74-94 6.77 0.08 7.88 0.06
ITAZOP 74-94 1.11 0.38 5.75 0.01
USAZOW 74-94 1.47 0.27 1.59 0.24
DEUZOW 74-94 3.37 0.05 7.88 0.00
GBRZOW 74-94 0.26 0.85 1.19 0.35
NLDZOW 74-94 1.57 0.25 1.30 0.32
ESPZOW 74-94 0.33 0.81 0.43 0.75
ITAZOW 74-94 1.35 0.30 0.52 0.68
FRAZ35 74-94 2.55 0.11 0.97 0.44
FRAZ38 74-94 1.45 0.28 0.77 0.53
DEUZ38 74-94 0.69 0.57 0.78 0.53
FRAZLF 74-94 0.02 1.00 2.19 0.15
FRAZMT 74-94 1.62 0.24 0.15 0.93
DEUZMT 74-94 3.11 0.06 2.54 0.10
ESPZMT 74-94 0.57 0.66 0.77 0.57
FRAZOG 74-94 0.29 0.83 0.24 0.86
ITAZOO 74-94 0.29 0.83 0.22 0.88
GBRZOG 74-94 0.73 0.55 2.43 0.12
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Wage growth determines labour growth - final regressions
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector;
Lijt δ0ij δ1ijpijt δ2ijrjt δ3ijAijt δ4ijwijt ηijt,
j = country;
w,p,r,A,L are defined cf. the basic perfect competition model;
η = random disturbance term.
Including constant term
SECTOR SMPL δ0 Tδ0 δ3 Tδ3 γ2 Tδ2 δ1 Tδ1 δ4 Tδ4 DWR2
GBRZ35 74-92 -0.03 (3.02) 0.17 (1.61) -0.00 (0.17) -0.04 (0.27) 0.29 (1.36) 0.21 1.76
GBRZMB 74-89 -0.09 (4.32) -0.51 (2.39) -0.00 (0.80) -0.11 (0.96) 0.34 (1.54) 0.01 1.97
Excluding constant term
Regression equation same as above, with δ0 = 0.
SECTOR SMPL δ3 Tδ3 γ2 Tδ2 δ1 Tδ1 δ4 Tδ4 DWR2
ESPZLX 80-91 0.04 (1.77) -0.00 (0.23) 0.06 (0.41) 0.91 (6.28) 0.73 1.45
GBRZLX 74-92 0.31 (3.24) -0.00 (0.26) -0.16 (1.10) 0.53 (3.34) 0.21 2.08
ITAZOP 74-94 -0.00 (0.34) -0.00 (1.49) 0.16 (3.05) 0.56 (3.20) 0.49 1.26
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APPENDIX B5
Basic regressions/Testing for structural breaks
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector subscript;
wijt e0ij e1aijMeuijt e1bijMneuijt e2ijrjt e3ijAijt e4ijLijt ψijt,
j = country subscript;
w,Meu,Mneu,r,A,L are defined cf. the imperfect competition model;
ψ = random disturbance term.
All definitions cf. appendix B1. If an entry cannot be calculated, it is denoted by ***.
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4 Te4 DW F81 p81 F85 p85R
2
DEUZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.74) 0.08 (1.05) 0.02 (1.48) 0.05 (0.65) 0.04 (0.40) 0.79 (4.83) 0.65 1.66 1.2 0.42 0.7 0.67
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (2.66) 0.03 (0.42) 0.01 (0.58) 0.01 (0.16) 0.05 (0.69) 0.96 (8.41) 0.64 1.54 2.1 0.18 1.0 0.51
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.42) 0.04 (1.60) 0.00 (0.56) 0.13 (1.79) -0.00 (0.14) 1.14 (10.81) 0.87 1.85 0.5 0.79 0.9 0.56
DEUZLX 74-92 0.01 (1.44) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.82) 0.05 (0.51) 0.06 (1.03) 0.87 (8.34) 0.84 1.54 2.3 0.14 1.1 0.47
DEUZMB 74-92 0.01 (2.41) -0.02 (0.36) 0.02 (1.26) 0.07 (0.56) 0.03 (0.32) 1.11 (3.16) 0.52 2.66 0.7 0.64 0.3 0.93
DEUZMT 74-92 0.01 (2.08) 0.08 (1.54) 0.00 (0.41) -0.08 (0.74) 0.17 (1.69) 0.92 (7.25) 0.79 1.47 3.4 0.07 2.4 0.14
DEUZOG 74-92 0.01 (0.83) 0.03 (1.45) 0.01 (0.89) 0.24 (2.48) -0.01 (0.53) 0.87 (4.96) 0.84 2.31 0.6 0.70 1.3 0.38
DEUZOO 74-92 0.03 (1.95) -0.00 (1.57) -0.01 (0.26) 0.12 (1.06) -0.01 (0.27) 0.88 (3.51) 0.59 2.01 3.7 0.06 0.3 0.94
DEUZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.27) -0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (1.07) 0.37 (4.06) -0.22 (3.02) 0.60 (3.62) 0.78 1.99 2.8 0.10 1.5 0.30
DEUZOW 74-92 0.01 (1.58) 0.00 (0.13) 0.00 (0.45) -0.02 (0.22) 0.13 (1.80) 0.99 (8.54) 0.85 2.62 2.1 0.18 1.6 0.26
FRAZ35 74-91 0.01 (1.50) -0.19 (1.52) 0.00 (3.14) 0.11 (1.83) 0.11 (2.33) 0.74 (1.75) 0.70 1.61 *** *** 0.5 0.79
FRAZ38 74-91 0.01 (0.94) 0.06 (0.26) 0.00 (1.10) 0.04 (0.42) 0.08 (0.97) 1.24 (4.77) 0.53 1.05 *** *** 0.7 0.64
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (0.57) 0.02 (0.21) 0.00 (0.41) 0.20 (1.17) -0.05 (0.71) -0.36 (0.41) -0.22 0.77 *** *** 0.3 0.89
FRAZLX 74-91 0.03 (1.22) 0.02 (0.32) 0.00 (0.59) -0.04 (0.39) 0.02 (0.26) 1.24 (2.33) 0.17 1.23 *** *** 0.2 0.98
FRAZMB 74-91 -0.01 (0.26) 0.07 (1.21) 0.00 (0.58) -0.03 (0.29) 0.03 (0.44) 0.78 (0.81) 0.12 2.75 *** *** 1.6 0.28
FRAZMT 74-91 0.01 (1.66) 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 (2.67) -0.06 (0.67) 0.19 (3.64) 1.08 (5.29) 0.75 1.35 *** *** 1.1 0.45
FRAZOG 74-91 0.00 (0.37) -0.05 (0.50) -0.00 (0.21) 0.26 (1.51) -0.03 (0.30) 0.63 (2.47) 0.53 2.53 *** *** 1.0 0.48
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.01 (0.48) 0.00 (1.52) -0.09 (0.49) 0.04 (0.46) 0.32 (0.32) -0.26 1.95 *** *** 1.6 0.28
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (5.68) -0.16 (3.96) -0.00 (2.01) -0.05 (1.54) 0.12 (2.77) -0.01 (0.02) 0.86 2.53 *** *** 0.6 0.72
FRAZOW 74-91 0.01 (0.51) 0.01 (0.38) 0.01 (1.26) -0.20 (1.02) 0.13 (1.91) 0.51 (2.02) 0.22 1.68 *** *** 0.2 0.98
GBRZ35 74-92 0.01 (0.94) 0.16 (0.70) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.14) -0.02 (0.37) 0.51 (2.59) 0.07 2.25 1.2 0.39 3.8 0.05
GBRZ38 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.01 (0.51) 0.00 (0.76) 0.12 (1.38) 0.02 (0.26) 0.29 (1.12) 0.10 1.93 2.8 0.10 1.8 0.22
GBRZLF 74-92 0.00 (0.03) 0.05 (0.26) -0.00 (0.24) 0.13 (1.92) -0.04 (0.41) -0.22 (0.56) -0.15 2.45 4.0 0.04 1.8 0.24
GBRZLX 74-92 0.03 (1.79) 0.30 (1.43) 0.00 (0.78) -0.06 (0.56) 0.22 (3.56) 0.67 (3.27) 0.53 2.21 6.8 0.01 7.8 0.01
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.44) 0.49 (1.11) 0.01 (1.31) 0.08 (0.76) -0.06 (0.36) 0.37 (0.94) -0.20 1.28 3.2 0.14 *** ***
GBRZMT 74-92 0.01 (0.45) 0.02 (0.08) 0.00 (0.58) 0.11 (0.93) -0.01 (0.10) 0.57 (2.47) 0.21 1.87 2.1 0.18 3.9 0.05
GBRZOG 74-92 0.02 (1.49) 0.52 (3.15) 0.00 (1.04) -0.03 (0.54) 0.03 (4.11) 0.12 (0.56) 0.63 1.99 0.6 0.73 2.5 0.13
GBRZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.45) -0.12 (0.43) 0.00 (0.08) 0.05 (0.43) 0.11 (0.71) -0.19 (1.39) -0.25 1.83 0.6 0.73 0.3 0.92
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (1.32) 0.09 (1.36) -0.00 (0.77) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.44 (1.62) 0.03 1.54 1.3 0.35 0.8 0.57
GBRZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.04 (0.53) 0.00 (0.19) 0.13 (1.02) -0.08 (0.96) 0.72 (3.99) 0.46 2.27 1.0 0.48 1.1 0.47
51
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4 Te4 DW F81 p81 F85 p85R
2
USAZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.41) 0.10 (0.83) -0.00 (0.41) 0.05 (0.93) -0.02 (0.67) 0.68 (3.87) 0.73 1.76 *** *** 0.7 0.67
USAZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.37) 0.10 (0.87) -0.00 (0.18) -0.01 (0.33) 0.05 (0.53) 0.80 (4.65) 0.90 1.73 *** *** 0.8 0.60
USAZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.99) 0.01 (0.19) -0.00 (2.00) 0.01 (0.30) 0.03 (0.92) 0.78 (2.66) 0.45 2.13 *** *** 0.6 0.73
USAZLX 74-92 0.01 (2.33) 0.06 (1.81) -0.00 (2.43) 0.00 (0.17) -0.04 (1.38) 1.19 (14.55) 0.95 1.35 *** *** 1.3 0.36
USAZMB 74-92 0.01 (0.91) 0.04 (0.58) -0.00 (0.46) 0.01 (0.69) 0.02 (0.82) 1.00 (10.11) 0.91 1.38 *** *** 3.9 0.05
USAZMT 74-92 0.01 (1.46) 0.09 (1.08) -0.00 (1.28) -0.01 (0.28) -0.01 (0.11) 0.97 (5.74) 0.90 2.04 *** *** 1.7 0.25
USAZOG 74-92 0.00 (0.28) 0.02 (0.58) -0.00 (0.24) -0.06 (1.42) 0.09 (1.61) 0.92 (5.41) 0.89 2.97 *** *** 0.3 0.90
USAZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.99) 0.05 (1.47) -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.08) 0.01 (0.22) 0.90 (6.12) 0.81 1.95 *** *** 0.4 0.84
USAZOP 74-92 0.01 (1.67) -0.02 (0.63) -0.00 (1.83) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.20) 1.05 (4.25) 0.67 2.15 *** *** 0.7 0.63
USAZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.20) 0.04 (1.82) -0.00 (1.94) 0.02 (1.25) 0.06 (3.16) 0.86 (11.93) 0.98 2.24 *** *** 0.9 0.56
ESPZ35 80-91 0.00 (0.46) 0.07 (1.28) 0.00 (0.21) -0.06 (0.62) 0.05 (1.69) 0.96 (6.22) 0.79 2.31 *** *** *** ***
ESPZ38 80-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.07 (2.31) -0.00 (4.39) -0.44 (4.39) 0.30 (3.44) 0.94 (9.27) 0.89 1.21 *** *** *** ***
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.60) 0.05 (1.39) -0.00 (7.08) -0.07 (1.32) -0.22 (5.84) 0.25 (1.33) 0.80 2.74 *** *** *** ***
ESPZLX 80-91 0.01 (0.58) -0.04 (1.27) -0.00 (0.65) -0.07 (1.06) -0.02 (0.17) 0.99 (4.41) 0.72 1.98 *** *** *** ***
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.78) 0.02 (0.77) -0.00 (0.96) -0.05 (0.59) 0.06 (0.91) 1.00 (4.28) 0.72 2.26 *** *** *** ***
ESPZMT 80-92 -0.01 (0.67) 0.13 (1.68) -0.00 (2.32) -0.15 (2.03) 0.16 (1.94) 0.90 (6.94) 0.73 1.95 *** *** *** ***
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.01 (0.70) 0.09 (0.96) -0.00 (0.32) -0.14 (1.46) 0.15 (1.59) 0.64 (3.13) 0.83 1.87 *** *** *** ***
ESPZOO 80-91 -0.00 (0.10) 0.02 (1.46) 0.00 (0.03) -0.17 (1.54) 0.11 (0.85) 0.62 (3.10) 0.67 1.07 *** *** *** ***
ESPZOP 80-91 0.02 (1.51) -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (1.43) -0.07 (0.80) 0.08 (1.35) 0.74 (6.94) 0.84 2.06 *** *** *** ***
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.52) -0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (1.03) 0.02 (0.13) 0.18 (1.06) 0.80 (3.89) 0.70 0.70 *** *** *** ***
ITAZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.72) 0.04 (0.58) 0.00 (0.33) 0.08 (0.78) -0.04 (0.58) 1.03 (4.99) 0.51 1.59 4.7 0.03 0.8 0.62
ITAZ38 74-92 0.03 (3.37) -0.19 (2.03) 0.00 (1.21) -0.06 (0.45) 0.10 (1.25) 0.97 (6.25) 0.74 2.06 5.4 0.02 0.3 0.91
ITAZLF 74-92 0.02 (2.47) -0.02 (0.46) -0.00 (0.48) 0.07 (1.46) -0.00 (0.04) 0.82 (4.35) 0.38 2.24 1.1 0.46 0.7 0.66
ITAZLX 74-92 -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (1.35) -0.07 (0.66) 0.13 (1.68) 0.54 (1.84) 0.35 2.27 3.1 0.08 0.1 0.99
ITAZMB 74-92 0.00 (0.21) 0.05 (1.76) -0.01 (1.54) 0.19 (2.29) -0.10 (1.64) 0.63 (1.85) 0.73 2.59 0.7 0.67 0.5 0.78
ITAZMT 74-92 0.02 (2.40) -0.06 (0.83) 0.00 (0.27) -0.05 (0.32) 0.10 (0.90) 1.01 (3.93) 0.60 1.93 1.3 0.36 0.2 0.98
ITAZOG 74-92 0.01 (2.45) -0.01 (0.79) 0.00 (1.04) 0.03 (0.36) 0.06 (0.93) 0.88 (5.22) 0.76 1.63 1.2 0.40 1.4 0.32
ITAZOO 74-92 0.02 (2.29) -0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (3.89) -0.10 (1.28) 0.08 (0.95) 0.99 (6.81) 0.71 1.86 1.3 0.36 0.8 0.57
ITAZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.00) -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (1.98) 0.02 (0.18) -0.02 (0.35) 0.77 (5.97) 0.44 1.77 0.9 0.53 0.4 0.88
NLDZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.54) 0.05 (0.55) -0.00 (0.34) 0.07 (1.28) -0.02 (0.63) 0.88 (4.67) 0.37 1.39 1.9 0.22 1.3 0.36
NLDZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.23) 0.05 (1.28) -0.00 (3.38) -0.08 (0.97) -0.06 (1.63) 1.11 (7.48) 0.69 1.44 1.6 0.27 0.7 0.69
NLDZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.59) 0.08 (0.91) -0.06 (1.32) 0.44 (1.14) 0.07 2.14 0.9 0.54 1.3 0.38
NLDZLX 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.02 (0.47) -0.00 (0.41) 0.12 (0.99) 0.07 (0.95) 0.68 (7.00) 0.72 1.57 0.2 0.96 2.9 0.10
NLDZMB 74-92 0.00 (0.09) 0.18 (4.10) 0.00 (4.55) 0.06 (1.61) 0.05 (1.26) 0.17 (0.66) 0.65 1.51 10.9 0.00 0.5 0.77
NLDZMT 74-92 0.01 (3.20) 0.06 (1.03) -0.00 (0.84) 0.11 (0.81) -0.10 (1.50) 0.77 (4.09) 0.55 1.17 2.0 0.19 0.9 0.57
NLDZOG 74-92 0.01 (2.04) -0.02 (0.48) -0.00 (0.81) 0.09 (0.92) -0.00 (0.04) 0.98 (8.26) 0.73 1.55 0.6 0.73 7.4 0.01
NLDZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.00 (0.24) 0.00 (0.91) -0.02 (0.20) -0.00 (0.02) 1.03 (4.69) 0.64 1.91 1.8 0.24 1.8 0.23
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APPENDIX B6
Taking structural breaks into account
Labour growth determines wage growth
Regression equation identical to appendix B1. All other definitions according to appendix B1 and B5.
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4 Te4 DWR
2
DEUZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.74) 0.08 (1.05) 0.02 (1.48) 0.05 (0.65) 0.04 (0.40) 0.79 (4.83) 0.65 1.66
DEUZ38 74-92 0.02 (2.66) 0.03 (0.42) 0.01 (0.58) 0.01 (0.16) 0.05 (0.69) 0.96 (8.41) 0.64 1.54
DEUZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.42) 0.04 (1.60) 0.00 (0.56) 0.13 (1.79) -0.00 (0.14) 1.14 (10.81) 0.87 1.85
DEUZLX 74-92 0.01 (1.44) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.82) 0.05 (0.51) 0.06 (1.03) 0.87 (8.34) 0.84 1.54
DEUZMB 74-92 0.01 (2.41) -0.02 (0.36) 0.02 (1.26) 0.07 (0.56) 0.03 (0.32) 1.11 (3.16) 0.52 2.66
DEUZMT 74-92 0.01 (2.08) 0.08 (1.54) 0.00 (0.41) -0.08 (0.74) 0.17 (1.69) 0.92 (7.25) 0.79 1.47
DEUZOG 74-92 0.01 (0.83) 0.03 (1.45) 0.01 (0.89) 0.24 (2.48) -0.01 (0.53) 0.87 (4.96) 0.84 2.31
DEUZOO 74-92 0.03 (1.95) -0.00 (1.57) -0.01 (0.26) 0.12 (1.06) -0.01 (0.27) 0.88 (3.51) 0.59 2.01
DEUZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.27) -0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (1.07) 0.37 (4.06) -0.22 (3.02) 0.60 (3.62) 0.78 1.99
DEUZOW 74-92 0.01 (1.58) 0.00 (0.13) 0.00 (0.45) -0.02 (0.22) 0.13 (1.80) 0.99 (8.54) 0.85 2.62
FRAZ35 74-91 0.01 (1.50) -0.19 (1.52) 0.00 (3.14) 0.11 (1.83) 0.11 (2.33) 0.74 (1.75) 0.70 1.61
FRAZ38 74-91 0.01 (0.94) 0.06 (0.26) 0.00 (1.10) 0.04 (0.42) 0.08 (0.97) 1.24 (4.77) 0.53 1.05
FRAZLF 74-91 0.01 (0.57) 0.02 (0.21) 0.00 (0.41) 0.20 (1.17) -0.05 (0.71) -0.36 (0.41) -0.22 0.77
FRAZLX 74-91 0.03 (1.22) 0.02 (0.32) 0.00 (0.59) -0.04 (0.39) 0.02 (0.26) 1.24 (2.33) 0.17 1.23
FRAZMB 74-91 -0.01 (0.26) 0.07 (1.21) 0.00 (0.58) -0.03 (0.29) 0.03 (0.44) 0.78 (0.81) 0.12 2.75
FRAZMT 74-91 0.01 (1.66) 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 (2.67) -0.06 (0.67) 0.19 (3.64) 1.08 (5.29) 0.75 1.35
FRAZOG 74-91 0.00 (0.37) -0.05 (0.50) -0.00 (0.21) 0.26 (1.51) -0.03 (0.30) 0.63 (2.47) 0.53 2.53
FRAZOO 74-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.01 (0.48) 0.00 (1.52) -0.09 (0.49) 0.04 (0.46) 0.32 (0.32) -0.26 1.95
FRAZOP 74-91 0.02 (5.68) -0.16 (3.96) -0.00 (2.01) -0.05 (1.54) 0.12 (2.77) -0.01 (0.02) 0.86 2.53
FRAZOW 74-91 0.01 (0.51) 0.01 (0.38) 0.01 (1.26) -0.20 (1.02) 0.13 (1.91) 0.51 (2.02) 0.22 1.68
GBRZ35 86-92 0.02 (0.72) 0.18 (0.56) -0.03 (4.69) 0.27 (0.63) -0.15 (1.06) -1.26 (1.01) 0.38 1.83
GBRZ38 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.01 (0.51) 0.00 (0.76) 0.12 (1.38) 0.02 (0.26) 0.29 (1.12) 0.10 1.93
GBRZLF 81-92 0.02 (0.90) 0.16 (0.49) -0.02 (4.61) 0.67 (2.72) -0.11 (1.05) 0.83 (1.51) 0.49 1.95
GBRZLX 86-92 0.10 (37.75) 1.92 (57.95) -0.02 (74.48) -0.12 (6.16) 0.21 (27.83) 0.19 (7.47) 1.00 1.31
GBRZMB 74-89 0.03 (0.44) 0.49 (1.11) 0.01 (1.31) 0.08 (0.76) -0.06 (0.36) 0.37 (0.94) -0.20 1.28
GBRZMT 86-92 -0.01 (2.30) -0.97 (7.71) 0.00 (1.53) 0.58 (10.59) 0.32 (3.56) 0.08 (0.67) 0.99 3.24
GBRZOG 74-92 0.02 (1.49) 0.52 (3.15) 0.00 (1.04) -0.03 (0.54) 0.03 (4.11) 0.12 (0.56) 0.63 1.99
GBRZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.45) -0.12 (0.43) 0.00 (0.08) 0.05 (0.43) 0.11 (0.71) -0.19 (1.39) -0.25 1.83
GBRZOP 74-92 0.02 (1.32) 0.09 (1.36) -0.00 (0.77) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.44 (1.62) 0.03 1.54
GBRZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.27) 0.04 (0.53) 0.00 (0.19) 0.13 (1.02) -0.08 (0.96) 0.72 (3.99) 0.46 2.27
USAZ35 74-92 0.01 (1.41) 0.10 (0.83) -0.00 (0.41) 0.05 (0.93) -0.02 (0.67) 0.68 (3.87) 0.73 1.76
USAZ38 74-92 0.00 (0.37) 0.10 (0.87) -0.00 (0.18) -0.01 (0.33) 0.05 (0.53) 0.80 (4.65) 0.90 1.73
USAZLF 74-92 0.01 (1.99) 0.01 (0.19) -0.00 (2.00) 0.01 (0.30) 0.03 (0.92) 0.78 (2.66) 0.45 2.13
USAZLX 74-92 0.01 (2.33) 0.06 (1.81) -0.00 (2.43) 0.00 (0.17) -0.04 (1.38) 1.19 (14.55) 0.95 1.35
USAZMB 86-92 -0.01 (1.07) -0.17 (3.46) -0.12 (1.69) 0.17 (1.64) -0.16 (1.31) 1.01 (2.67) 0.93 3.01
USAZMT 74-92 0.01 (1.46) 0.09 (1.08) -0.00 (1.28) -0.01 (0.28) -0.01 (0.11) 0.97 (5.74) 0.90 2.04
USAZOG 74-92 0.00 (0.28) 0.02 (0.58) -0.00 (0.24) -0.06 (1.42) 0.09 (1.61) 0.92 (5.41) 0.89 2.97
USAZOO 74-92 0.01 (0.99) 0.05 (1.47) -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.08) 0.01 (0.22) 0.90 (6.12) 0.81 1.95
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SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4 Te4 DWR
2
USAZOP 74-92 0.01 (1.67) -0.02 (0.63) -0.00 (1.83) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.20) 1.05 (4.25) 0.67 2.15
USAZOW 74-92 -0.00 (0.20) 0.04 (1.82) -0.00 (1.94) 0.02 (1.25) 0.06 (3.16) 0.86 (11.93) 0.98 2.24
ESPZ35 80-91 0.00 (0.46) 0.07 (1.28) 0.00 (0.21) -0.06 (0.62) 0.05 (1.69) 0.96 (6.22) 0.79 2.31
ESPZ38 80-91 0.00 (0.12) 0.07 (2.31) -0.00 (4.39) -0.44 (4.39) 0.30 (3.44) 0.94 (9.27) 0.89 1.21
ESPZLF 80-91 0.01 (1.60) 0.05 (1.39) -0.00 (7.08) -0.07 (1.32) -0.22 (5.84) 0.25 (1.33) 0.80 2.74
ESPZLX 80-91 0.01 (0.58) -0.04 (1.27) -0.00 (0.65) -0.07 (1.06) -0.02 (0.17) 0.99 (4.41) 0.72 1.98
ESPZMB 80-91 0.01 (0.78) 0.02 (0.77) -0.00 (0.96) -0.05 (0.59) 0.06 (0.91) 1.00 (4.28) 0.72 2.26
ESPZMT 80-92 -0.01 (0.67) 0.13 (1.68) -0.00 (2.32) -0.15 (2.03) 0.16 (1.94) 0.90 (6.94) 0.73 1.95
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.01 (0.70) 0.09 (0.96) -0.00 (0.32) -0.14 (1.46) 0.15 (1.59) 0.64 (3.13) 0.83 1.87
ESPZOO 80-91 -0.00 (0.10) 0.02 (1.46) 0.00 (0.03) -0.17 (1.54) 0.11 (0.85) 0.62 (3.10) 0.67 1.07
ESPZOP 80-91 0.02 (1.51) -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (1.43) -0.07 (0.80) 0.08 (1.35) 0.74 (6.94) 0.84 2.06
ESPZOW 80-91 -0.01 (0.52) -0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (1.03) 0.02 (0.13) 0.18 (1.06) 0.80 (3.89) 0.70 0.70
ITAZ35 81-92 0.02 (2.57) -0.01 (0.17) 0.01 (1.09) 0.09 (0.75) -0.01 (0.10) 0.92 (3.35) 0.70 1.89
ITAZ38 81-92 0.02 (2.86) -0.12 (1.66) -0.00 (0.91) -0.05 (0.64) 0.13 (2.29) 0.96 (6.18) 0.83 3.68
ITAZLF 74-92 0.02 (2.47) -0.02 (0.46) -0.00 (0.48) 0.07 (1.46) -0.00 (0.04) 0.82 (4.35) 0.38 2.24
ITAZLX 74-92 -0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (1.35) -0.07 (0.66) 0.13 (1.68) 0.54 (1.84) 0.35 2.27
ITAZMB 74-92 0.00 (0.21) 0.05 (1.76) -0.01 (1.54) 0.19 (2.29) -0.10 (1.64) 0.63 (1.85) 0.73 2.59
ITAZMT 74-92 0.02 (2.40) -0.06 (0.83) 0.00 (0.27) -0.05 (0.32) 0.10 (0.90) 1.01 (3.93) 0.60 1.93
ITAZOG 74-92 0.01 (2.45) -0.01 (0.79) 0.00 (1.04) 0.03 (0.36) 0.06 (0.93) 0.88 (5.22) 0.76 1.63
ITAZOO 74-92 0.02 (2.29) -0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (3.89) -0.10 (1.28) 0.08 (0.95) 0.99 (6.81) 0.71 1.86
ITAZOP 74-92 0.01 (2.00) -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (1.98) 0.02 (0.18) -0.02 (0.35) 0.77 (5.97) 0.44 1.77
NLDZ35 74-92 0.01 (2.54) 0.05 (0.55) -0.00 (0.34) 0.07 (1.28) -0.02 (0.63) 0.88 (4.67) 0.37 1.39
NLDZ38 74-92 0.02 (3.23) 0.05 (1.28) -0.00 (3.38) -0.08 (0.97) -0.06 (1.63) 1.11 (7.48) 0.69 1.44
NLDZLF 74-92 0.01 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.59) 0.08 (0.91) -0.06 (1.32) 0.44 (1.14) 0.07 2.14
NLDZLX 74-92 -0.01 (0.58) -0.02 (0.47) -0.00 (0.41) 0.12 (0.99) 0.07 (0.95) 0.68 (7.00) 0.72 1.57
NLDZMB 81-92 -0.01 (3.24) 0.17 (12.03) 0.01 (1.61) 0.06 (4.35) -0.02 (1.40) -0.10 (1.00) 0.85 2.24
NLDZMT 74-92 0.01 (3.20) 0.06 (1.03) -0.00 (0.84) 0.11 (0.81) -0.10 (1.50) 0.77 (4.09) 0.55 1.17
NLDZMT 86-92 0.03 (3.11) 0.13 (1.34) 0.06 (1.73) -0.26 (0.89) 0.03 (0.24) -0.22 (0.31) 0.66 2.60
NLDZOP 74-92 0.02 (3.35) -0.00 (0.24) 0.00 (0.91) -0.02 (0.20) -0.00 (0.02) 1.03 (4.69) 0.64 1.91
Wage growth determines labour growth - final regressions
Regression equation is:
where, i = sector;
Lijt g0ij g1aijMeuijt g1bijMneuijt g2ijrijt g3ijAijt g4ijwijt piijt,
j = country;
w,Meu,Mneu,r,A,L are defined cf. the imperfect competition model;
pi = random disturbance term.
SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4 Te4 DWR
2
ESPZLX 80-91 -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) -0.03 (1.44) 0.87 2.09
GBRZ35 74-92 -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) -0.03 (2.87) 0.42 1.81
GBRZLX 86-92 -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) -0.53 (11.51) 1.00 1.25
GBRZMB 74-89 -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) 0.34 2.17
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SECTOR SMPL e0 Te0 e3 Te3 e2 Te2 e1a Te1a e1b Te1b e4 Te4 DWR
2
ITAZOP 81-92 -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) -0.01 (2.91) 0.82 1.62
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APPENDIX B7
Solutions to the system of equations
The equations from which these solutions follow are given on p. 5. Values for the coefficients e0-4 are taken from appendix B6.
SECTOR SMPL δ εφ(β θ)
1 α β Bˆ α(φ 1) β(φ 1)
α(φ 1)
β(φ 1)
USAZOW 74-92 0.53 0.12 -0.88 0.55 0.96 0.90 1.87
USAZOP 74-92 1.20 1.94 2.09 -0.57 0.89 0.43 1.32
USAZOO 74-92 1.46 0.95 1.39 0.13 0.89 2.72 3.61
USAZOG 74-92 1.80 -1.69 0.18 2.01 0.91 2.18 3.10
USAZMT 74-92 0.49 -0.68 2.37 -2.38 0.88 3.27 4.14
USAZMB 86-92 1.75 0.70 -5.36 -0.98 0.81 0.71 1.52
USAZLX 74-92 -0.96 0.82 0.13 -1.45 0.89 0.45 1.34
USAZLF 74-92 0.28 2.28 1.70 0.75 0.87 2.67 3.54
USAZ38 74-92 -0.16 -0.29 0.35 0.64 0.95 1.20 2.14
USAZ35 74-92 -0.36 0.66 1.12 -0.41 0.94 1.17 2.11
NLDZOP 74-92 15.19 -5.77 2.08 -6.01 0.13 3.29 3.43
NLDZMT 86-92 0.60 0.58 -0.37 -0.50 1.07 0.41 1.48
NLDZMT 74-92 0.25 0.09 0.07 -0.18 0.95 0.99 1.94
NLDZMB 81-92 1.33 -0.68 1.08 0.35 1.04 1.17 2.22
NLDZLX 74-92 2.05 0.18 -1.48 1.27 0.92 1.47 2.39
NLDZLF 74-92 -0.46 -2.18 -1.40 2.00 1.11 -1.27 -0.17
NLDZ38 74-92 -0.64 -2.09 0.32 -1.75 0.91 0.36 1.27
NLDZ35 74-92 0.88 1.17 0.08 -0.48 0.93 1.72 2.64
ITAZOO 74-92 -3.22 1.82 -0.13 -1.17 1.06 -1.68 -0.62
ITAZOG 74-92 129.23 15.01 5.20 39.82 -1.56 61.13 59.56
ITAZMT 74-92 -3.07 2.24 -0.49 -0.24 1.13 -0.50 0.63
ITAZMB 74-92 0.25 0.16 0.05 -0.15 0.96 0.67 1.63
ITAZLX 74-92 -1.62 3.90 1.34 -0.45 1.18 -2.69 -1.50
ITAZLF 74-92 1.29 0.79 0.11 -0.30 0.96 1.00 1.95
ITAZ38 81-92 2.64 -1.27 0.39 0.23 0.91 2.26 3.17
ITAZ35 81-92 -1.93 -1.47 -0.15 1.24 1.06 -1.61 -0.54
GBRZOW 74-92 -0.82 -0.21 0.94 2.13 1.09 -1.67 -0.58
GBRZOP 74-92 -0.87 0.37 0.18 0.67 0.92 0.93 1.85
GBRZOO 74-92 0.11 -1.25 -2.07 -0.22 1.11 0.57 1.68
GBRZOG 74-92 3.92 3.53 -1.00 -2.19 1.39 -1.29 0.11
GBRZMT 86-92 -6.88 -2.10 0.79 -1.10 1.14 -2.98 -1.84
GBRZLF 81-92 2.55 2.29 0.42 -0.52 0.87 2.99 3.86
GBRZ38 74-92 -35.11 -6.33 72.81 -11.00 3.75 -22.07 -18.32
FRAZOW 74-91 -1.13 0.57 -2.04 -0.22 1.09 -1.24 -0.15
FRAZOP 74-91 -1.74 -2.03 0.41 0.28 0.87 -2.43 -1.56
FRAZOO 74-91 -0.86 3.30 -0.45 -1.07 1.13 -1.10 0.03
FRAZOG 74-91 1.77 0.34 0.53 -0.57 0.95 0.94 1.88
FRAZMT 74-91 -0.14 2.21 -2.62 -0.52 1.12 -0.48 0.64
FRAZMB 74-91 -2.18 5.28 15.03 -3.80 1.53 -11.09 -9.57
FRAZLX 74-91 4.07 -30.39 13.25 10.41 -1.40 10.49 9.08
FRAZLF 74-91 -18.68 5.95 18.34 -20.55 -0.36 -13.24 -13.59
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SECTOR SMPL δ εφ(β θ)
1 α β Bˆ α(φ 1) β(φ 1)
α(φ 1)
β(φ 1)
FRAZ38 74-91 2.03 -1.90 -0.32 -3.75 1.19 -0.84 0.35
FRAZ35 74-91 -5.42 -0.42 -0.22 -0.41 1.21 -4.17 -2.96
ESPZOW 80-91 -7.55 -0.95 7.18 -1.05 1.26 -5.74 -4.48
ESPZOP 80-91 3.46 -2.58 0.31 2.52 0.88 2.48 3.36
ESPZOO 80-91 4.05 -1.71 -2.44 0.57 0.70 5.17 5.87
ESPZOG 80-91 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19 0.11 0.97 0.59 1.55
ESPZMT 80-92 1.70 -0.39 -1.79 0.25 0.92 1.88 2.81
ESPZMB 80-91 2.72 -1.71 2.18 1.64 0.88 3.18 4.06
ESPZLF 80-91 -0.18 -0.71 0.04 -0.23 0.97 0.22 1.18
ESPZ38 80-91 1.10 -1.93 1.65 1.07 0.85 3.81 4.66
ESPZ35 80-91 -6.74 14.38 -8.24 -9.25 1.84 -21.99 -20.14
DEUZOW 74-92 -3.77 1.14 -2.95 -0.38 1.14 -3.88 -2.73
DEUZOP 74-92 -18.41 -5.34 -10.20 4.23 1.59 -9.78 -8.18
DEUZOO 74-92 2.00 0.12 0.26 -0.26 0.95 1.29 2.24
DEUZOG 74-92 -0.94 -0.32 -0.73 0.33 1.06 -1.36 -0.30
DEUZMT 74-92 -1.01 3.78 -0.15 -0.58 1.16 -3.98 -2.82
DEUZMB 74-92 -7.70 -9.80 -1.14 -2.99 1.61 -2.45 -0.84
DEUZLX 74-92 -1.68 -0.82 -0.06 -1.10 1.07 -1.75 -0.67
DEUZLF 74-92 0.44 -0.31 -1.97 0.86 1.13 -0.52 0.60
DEUZ38 74-92 -1.22 -0.09 -0.16 -0.68 1.06 -1.60 -0.54
DEUZ35 74-92 -0.57 -4.84 -0.60 -3.13 1.40 -8.60 -7.20
Wage growth determines labour growth - solutions to the system of equations
SECTOR SMPL δ εφ(β θ)
1 α β Bˆ α(φ 1) β(φ 1)
α(φ 1)
β(φ 1)
GBRZ35 74-92 -2.17 -2.80 5.08 -0.63 4.26 -3.77 0.49
GBRZMB 74-89 0.65 -0.53 -0.79 0.12 0.82 0.20 1.03
ESPZLX 80-91 1.62 1.97 -0.87 0.85 -0.94 2.03 1.10
ITAZOP 81-92 0.61 -0.54 -0.15 -0.40 0.41 0.62 1.03
GBRZLX 86-92 -5.09 -2.00 1.89 0.36 2.70 -1.83 0.88
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